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 ABSTRACT 
 
Like many other places in the world, Malaya was pushed to the frontier of 
decolonization after the end of World War II. Secularism, Communism, Islamic 
revivalism, as well as some other forces that represented particular ethnic or 
ideological interests competed with each other intensely in the political arena. Despite 
the heavy pressure of the Emergency Regulations against the communist remnants, 
left-wing political parties remained active in Malaya, as the leftists believed that their 
socialist ideology would provide an alternative to the ethnic-based politics of Malaya 
that had been deeply rooted on the British colonial rule.  
 
On 30 August 1957, exactly the same day when the independence of Malaya was 
declared, the Labor Party and the Parti Rakyat formed the Malayan Peoples’ Socialist 
Front in order to contest the first general election after the country’s independence. 
Although the two constituent parties were actually dominated by Chinese and Malays 
respectively, the Socialist Front claimed that their non-communal approaches to 
independence would promise a brighter future for the people of Malaya irrespective of 
their races and origins. However, the Socialist Front only existed for a very brief 
period in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The disintegration of the Socialist Front was 
not only directly affected by its failure in attracting voters in elections, but also 
indirectly influenced by the coalition’s intrinsic internal conflicts, which were caused 
by the leftists’ different understandings on various political issues, largely due to the 
mono-ethnic nature of each constituent party. 
  ii 
 
On one hand, the conflicts between Malay leftists and their non-Malay counterparts 
could be explained by the primordialist view that “ethnic groups are characterized by 
deep, ineffable attachments related to family, language, territory, custom, and 
religion.” On the other hand, however, although the situationalist view on identity 
contradicts the primordialist one, its ideas are also applicable to the case of left-wing 
organizations in early independent Malaya, especially at the regional level: instead of 
being predetermined and static, the similarities and differences between ethnic 
identities were artificially constructed, modified and politically influenced. Despite 
sharing the same ideology and space of living, the “Malayness” and “Chineseness” 
seemed to be two contesting forces that alienated people from each other through the 
construction of distant connections with their respective ethnic “selves” who had very 
little life experience in common. 
 
R. K. Vasil argued that Malaysian politics was more “communal” than “ideological”. 
In this thesis, however, I challenge the validity of this argument by not only exploring 
the rise and fall of the Socialist Front, but also by scrutinizing the roles that the leftists 
played in the major events in the formation of Malaysia. I will first demonstrate how 
the Socialist Front articulated its political ideal of “democratic socialism” and how the 
Malay left and non-Malay left were formed differently. Subsequently, I will 
investigate the three major debates that the Socialist Front engaged in, namely the 
making of Malaysia’s national language and education system, the merger with 
Singapore, as well as the dispute over the three territories in North Borneo. For this 
  iii 
part, my main sources are the newspapers published by the Socialist Front and its 
constituent parties, such as the Chinese newspaper Huo Yan Bao, the Malay 
newspaper Suara Rakyat, as well as some other official documents. In the third part, I 
will pay close attention to the deep-rooted divergence between the two constituent 
parties of the Socialist Front by comparing the two constituent parties’ different 
understandings on Malaysian issues and their distinct approaches to the formation of 
the new country. Primarily focusing on various key issues that led to the collapse of 
the socialist coalition in 1965, this study attempts to provide an alternative 
interpretation of Malaysian politics by looking beyond the pure communalistic line. I 
argue that although eventually superseded by fundamental yet indeterminate factors 
such as race, religion and cultural resentment, ideological struggles and communal 
struggles are not mutually exclusive. Instead, left-wing ideology is in fact deeply 
embedded in the country’s communal political struggles, within which various 
interests groups make efforts to contest the problematic “equality” under the banner of 
“We” (all Malaysians) instead of “we” (individual ethnic group).  
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Contesting Equality: A History of the Malayan People’s 
Socialist Front, 1957-1965 
 
Kankan Xie 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Like many other places in the world, Malaya was pushed to the frontier of decolonization 
after the end of World War II. Secularism, Communism, Islamic revivalism, as well as 
some other forces that represented particular ethnic or ideological interests competed 
with each other intensely in the political arena. While the ideology-based Malayan 
Communist Party (MCP) was significantly handicapped during the Malayan 
Emergency, 1 the nationalist Alliance, which was largely consisted of purely ethnic-based 
political parties such as the United Malays National Organization (UMNO), the Malayan 
Chinese Association (MCA) and the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC), gained 
considerable power not only because of the support of their respective ethnic group, but 
also the assistance of the British authority. In return, these communal parties took a firm 
anti-communist stance in hope of making themselves the most desirable candidates for 
the British to hand over their power.  
 
Despite the heavy pressure of the Emergency Regulations against the communist 
remnants, left-wing political parties remained very active, as they believed that their 
                                                 
1 A guerrilla war fought between Commonwealth and the Malayan National Liberation 
Army (MNLA) led by the outlawed Malayan Communist Party (MCP) from 1948 to 
1960.  
 2 
socialist ideology would provide an alternative to the ethnic-based politics of Malaya that 
had been deeply rooted on the British colonial rule. And thus, their non-communal 
approaches to independence would promise a great future for the people of Malaya 
irrespective of their races and origins. In response to the upheaval of the left-wing 
resurgence elsewhere in the world, parties comprised of large numbers of students, labors 
and trade unionists started to launch aggressive struggles in the hope of realizing social 
justice, equality in the newly independent Malaya as part of their efforts in materializing 
a “brave new world”. 2 Although many of these forces suffered failures during this tough 
period, to a certain extent, some of them did pose challenges to the country’s more 
powerful communalism. 
 
On 30 August 1957, exactly the same day when the independence of Malaya was 
declared, the Labor Party and the Parti Rakyat3 formed the Malayan Peoples’ Socialist 
Front in order to contest the first general election after the country’s independence. 
Although the two constituent parties were actually dominated by Chinese and Malays 
respectively, the Socialist Front claimed itself as a left-wing political organization built 
upon non-communal basis. Objectively speaking, the non-communal ideology of the 
Socialist Front did promote the solidarity of the newly established country and effectively 
bridged the estrangements between ethnic groups that had been existed throughout the 
colonial era. Their debates with the ruling Alliance, as well as those conducted within the 
                                                 
2 Cheah, Boon-Kheng, 2006, The Leftwing Movement in Malaya, Singapore and Borneo 
in the 1960s: ‘An Era of Hope or Devil’s Decade’? Inter-Asia Cultural Studies 7 (4) (12): 
634-49. 
3 The old Malay spelling was raayat. Sometimes, the party was also known as Parti 
Raayat, literally means “the People’s Party”. 
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Socialist Front itself also exerted far-reaching influences on Malaysian politics in many 
positive ways. However, the Socialist Front only existed for a very brief period. The 
disintegration of the Socialist Front was not only directly affected by its failure in 
attracting voters in elections, but also indirectly influenced by the coalition’s intrinsic 
internal conflicts, which were caused by the leftists’ different understandings on various 
political issues, largely due to the mono-ethnic nature of each constituent party. 
 
On one hand, the conflicts between Malay leftists and their non-Malay counterparts could 
be explained by the primordialist view that “ethnic groups are characterized by deep, 
ineffable attachments related to family, language, territory, custom, and religion.” 4 Both 
Eduard Shils and Clifford Geertz believed that the core of primordialism is the emotional 
strength of "sacred" ethnic bonds, as Geerts argued:"(ethnic identity is)…a system of 
inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men communicate, 
perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes toward life. "5 In this sense, 
ethnic identity is pre-determined and static, and therefore people's emotional attachments 
"do not develop and change in the course of social interactions but are natural affections. 
Thus, ethnicity has a fixed, compelling, a priori, and involuntary quality. "6 This may also 
illustrate one of the reasons why the Socialist Front, although shared a common ideology 
and claimed to be non-communal, still ended up getting disintegrated due to their ethnic 
divergence.   
                                                 
4 Robbins, Vernon K., David B. Gowler, L. Gregory Bloomquist, and Duane Frederick 
Watson, 2003, Fabrics of Discourse: Essays in Honor of Vernon K. Robbins. Harrisburg, 
PA: Trinity Press International, 224. 
5 Geertz, Clifford. 1973. The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays. New York: 
Basic Books, 89. 
6 ibid. 
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On the other hand, however, although the situationalist view on identity contradicts the 
primordialist one, its ideas are also applicable to the case of left-wing organizations in 
early independent Malaya, especially at the regional level: instead of being predetermined 
and static, the similarities and differences between ethnic identities were artificially 
constructed, modified and politically influenced. Edmund Leach did a great job in his 
research in highland Burma, in which he wonderfully demonstrated the fluid identities of 
the Kachin and Shan population. 7 Rather than those primordial factors such as race, 
language or religion, it was the ever-changing political needs that constantly shaped 
people's identities and relative positions in the power hierarchy. In the case of island 
Southeast Asia, Malay left-wing extremists, taking an obvious pro-Indonesian stance, 
sought to link the destiny of Malaya to the newly independent Indonesia under the 
leadership of the left-leaning leader Sukarno. They further aimed to ultimately bring the 
Archipelago (the so-called Melayu Raya 8  comprised of Malaya, the Philippines and 
Indonesia) back to the glorious ages of the Malay nation-state, in which Malay 
sovereignty could be fully realized. By contrast, Chinese-Malayan leftists were deeply 
influenced by their counterparts from China, Singapore, and the banned MCP, drawing 
more from Chinese ethno-racial connections than any shared ideological orientation.  
Despite sharing the same ideology and space of living, the “Malayness” and 
“Chineseness” seemed to be two contesting forces that alienated people from each other 
                                                 
7 Leach, Edmund Ronald, 1965. Political systems of Highland Burma: a study of Kachin 
social structure. Boston: Beacon Press. 
8 Also known as Indonesia Raya 
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through the construction of distant connections with their respective ethnic “selves” who 
had very little life experience in common. 
 
R. K. Vasil's Politics in A Plural Society: A Study of Non-Communal Political Parties in 
West Malaysia is a major contribution on this topic. By investigating the marginal roles 
that the leftists played and by problematizing the general ethnic-based political climate in 
Malaysia, this book offered detailed introductions to the non-communal political parties 
in Malaysia. 9 He made an argument that “Malaysian politics in its various manifestations 
has been more ‘communal’ than ‘ideological’”. 10 However, Vasil only focused on the 
specific political struggles of these left-wing organizations and ignored the domestic and 
international backdrop within which non-communal ideology was formed and developed. 
 
Therefore, I challenge the validity of Vasil’s argument by not only exploring the rise and 
fall of the Socialist Front, but also by scrutinizing the roles that the leftists played in the 
major events in the formation of Malaysia. In the first part, I will briefly introduce how 
the Socialist Front articulated its political ideal of “democratic socialism” and how it was 
distinct from the claims that the communal parties made. By paying close attention to the 
genesis of left-wing organizations in earlier period, I will also try to demonstrate how the 
Malay left and non-Malay left were formed differently. The second part consists of three 
major debates that the Socialist Front engaged in, namely the making of Malaysia’s 
                                                 
9 Vasil, R. K., and Australian Institute of International Affairs, 1971, Politics in a Plural 
Society: A Study of Non-Communal Political Parties in West Malaysia. Kuala Lumpur; 
New York: Published for the Australian Institute of International Affairs [by] Oxford 
University Press. 
10 Also see Rustam A. Sani. 2008. Social roots of the Malay Left: an analysis of the 
Kesatuan Melayu Muda. Petaling Jaya: SIRD, P1. 
 6 
national language and education system, the merger with Singapore, and the dispute over 
the three territories in North Borneo. For this part, my main sources are the newspapers 
published by the Socialist Front and its constituent parties, such as the Chinese 
newspaper Huo Yan Bao, the Malay newspaper Suara Rakyat, as well as some other 
official documents. In the third part, I will investigate the deep-rooted divergence 
between the two constituent parties of the Socialist Front by comparing their different 
understandings of Malaysian issues and their distinct approaches to the formation of the 
new country. Primarily focusing on various key issues that led to the collapse of the 
socialist coalition in 1965, this study attempts to provide an alternative interpretation of 
Malaysian politics by looking beyond the pure communalistic line. I argue that although 
eventually superseded by fundamental yet indeterminate factors such as race, religion and 
cultural resentment, ideological struggles and communal struggles are not mutually 
exclusive. Instead, left-wing ideology is in fact deeply embedded in the country’s 
communal political struggles, within which various interests groups make efforts to 
contest the problematic “equality” under the banner of “We” (all Malaysians) instead of 
“we” (individual ethnic group). 
  
 7 
 
II. ANATOMY OF THE MALAYAN PEOPLE’S SOCIALIST FRONT 
 
2.1 Articulating Socialism  
The Socialist Front was founded in 1957 and officially registered in 1958 based on the 
shared political and economic ideology of the Labor Party and the Parti Rakyat. Labeling 
itself as a non-communal association of socialist parties, it sought to establish a socialist 
country in Malaya through non-violent political struggles within the framework of its 
constitution, which was grounded upon concepts of “democratic socialism”. 11  The 
Socialist Front aimed to unite all parties with socialist ideals in Malaya through 
democratic and voluntary integrations.12 Right after its inauguration, the Socialist Front 
set its main objectives as: 
 
“(1). to organize and maintain a united front of all democratic socialist 
organizations in the Federation of Malaya; 
(2). to establish a democratic socialist state in Malaya; 
(3). to promote the merger of Malaya and Singapore; 
(4). to cooperate with democratic socialist organizations in other countries in 
order to facilitate the works of the united front; 
                                                 
11 Chen, Jianhong. 2000. Malaiya Laogongdang Wenxian Huibian马来亚劳工党文献汇
编 (The Labor Party of Malaya: Selected Documents), Kuala Lumpur: Malaiya 
Laogongdang Dangshi Gongzuo Weiyuanhui. p56 
12 Zhu, Qiying, Yongcai Yan, and Malaiya Laogongdang Dangshi Gongzuo Weiyuanhui. 
2001. Malaiya Laogongdang Douzheng Shi, 1952 nian-1972 nian马来亚劳工党斗争史
(The History of the Malayan Labor Party, 1952-1972), Kuala Lumpur: Malaiya 
Laogongdang Dangshi Gongzuo Weiyuanhui, p149. 
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(5). to promote the liberation of all peoples in Malaya in terms of politics, society 
and economy.” 13 
 
Based on the draft that the Parti Rakyat composed, the Socialist Front passed its policy 
statement named Towards a New Malaya in 1959. The statement, regarded as a key 
material for propaganda and the blueprint for the implementation of socialist policies, 
demonstrated that “the Socialist Front, unlike other parties in Malaya, saw clearly that the 
struggle in Malaya must necessarily develop into a struggle between Rakyat (the people) 
irrespective of 'race', and the feudalist-capitalist groups.”14 The Socialist Front regarded 
the Alliance, which mainly consisted of communal parties such as the UMNO, MCA and 
MIC, as only representing the interests of the dominating elites from each of the three 
major ethnic groups. 15 In the Socialist Front’s view, the tension caused by people’s 
cultural resentment would be further intensified if ethnic-based parties remain in power. 
In order to oppose such racial politics, the Socialist Front asserted that the people of 
Malaya must be re-categorized as oppressors and the oppressed, as they suggested that 
the current political system prevented the underprivileged labors from protecting their 
own interests and terribly blurred the internal differences within each ethnic group.  
 
The Socialist Front regarded itself as the vanguard of the exploited working people. 
Constituted of the Labor Party and Parti Rakyat, the Socialist Front thus claimed that they 
represented both workers (largely non-Malays who worked in tin mines and rubber 
                                                 
13 ibid. 
14 Malayan Peoples' Socialist Front, 1960, Towards a New Malaya: Policy Statement. 
15 ibid. 
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plantations) and peasants (Malays who lived in rural areas). In the meantime, in order to 
gain more extensive support, the Socialist Front’s definition of “working people” did not 
exclude the intellectual workers and the “national capitalists.” According to their 
definition, the intellectual workers were those “gurus, ustaz, professionals, and 
technicians,” who “earn their living not by their capital but by their labor;” 16  whereas 
the loosely defined “national capitalists” covered a broad range of people, included all 
people who could accept the ideology and were supportive of the Socialist Front. In fact, 
most of these “national capitalists” were the funding sources of the Socialist Front: I will 
elaborate this point in a later chapter. 
 
During the very period of the Malayan Emergency, almost every political force tried to 
distance itself from the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) as far as possible. It was not 
surprising that the Socialist Front was often linked to the MCP due to their similar left-
leaning ideology and their anti-British, anti-capitalist stance. To survive the harsh 
Emergency Regulations, the Socialist Front positioned itself in a less extremist way, as it 
claimed that the Socialist Front “is a democratic socialist organization believing in the 
achievement of power in a democratic state by peaceful, non-violent, democratic and 
constitutional means.” While carrying on its anti-oppression struggles, the Socialist Front 
conducted a series of debates against the ruling Alliance to justify its self-alleged 
socialist-yet-non-communist ideology. The Socialist Front pointed out that there was a 
widespread dissatisfaction amongst the “underprivileged classes”, and the Alliance 
politicians, who received their pro-British education during the colonial era, were not 
                                                 
16 ibid. 
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able to sense the situation. The race-blind MCP and subsequently the Socialist Front, by 
contrast, would be capable to “meet the needs of the people and satisfy their wants.”17 
The Socialist Front also asserted that their main goal was to conduct detailed analysis of 
the Malayan situation and find out a method to apply its ideology accordingly.  
 
To curb the development of the Socialist Front, the Alliance-dominated government 
started to characterize the opposition left-wing parties as subversive forces that should be 
equally treated as communists under the Emergency Regulations. On one hand, the 
Socialist Front deemed the communist insurgency as part of Malayan People’s anti-
British struggle, which aimed to completely liberalize the country. On the other hand, 
however, they must label themselves as “moderates” or “moderate leftists” in order to 
retain its legal status, so that they could be continuously recognized by the powerful 
British authority. As Malaysian historian Cheah Boon-Kheng put it, left-wing parties 
“found themselves on the horns of a dilemma”, since ”whether to support or sympathize 
with the outlawed communist party in its armed struggle and goals, or to denounce it and 
keep their political distance from it, most started as anti-communist, or non-communist 
parties, but ended up eventually as ‘Communist Front’ organizations.” 18 Compared to the 
Alliance, not only the Socialist Front positioned itself as taking a more pro-communist 
stance because of the shared ideological orientations, the Alliance government also 
                                                 
17 Chen, Jianhong, 2000, Malaiya Laogongdang Wenxian Huibian马来亚劳工党文献汇
编 (The Labor Party of Malaya: Selected Documents), Kuala Lumpur: Malaiya 
Laogongdang Dangshi Gongzuo Weiyuanhui. p67 
18 Boon-Kheng, Cheah, 2006, The Leftwing Movement in Malaya, Singapore and Borneo 
in the 1960s: ‘An Era of Hope or Devil’s Decade’? Inter-Asia Cultural Studies 7 (4) (12): 
634-49. 
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intentionally labeled the Socialist Front as “communist sympathizers” in order to gain 
more substantial advantages in elections under the Emergency Regulations. 
 
2.2 The Making of Malay and Non-Malay Left 
The Socialist Front sought to introduce a non-communal alternative to the ingrained 
racial politics in Malaya, but in fact this idea was not new at all—the genesis of both the 
Labor Party and Parti Rakyat could be dated back to late colonial period. In other words, 
the predecessors of the Socialist Front had been long since struggling under the banner of 
non-ethnic-based left-wing ideology: 
 
As early as 1945, Ahmad Boestamam, the founder of the Parti Rakyat, already worked 
closely with the KRIS (Kesatuan Rakyat Indonesia Semenanjung, Union of Peninsular 
Indonesia), which "considered the destiny of the Malays to be closely linked to Indonesia, 
and sought to declare joint independence for Malaya and Indonesia. "19 Subsequently, 
Ahmad Boestamam also played a critical role in the formation of the Malay National 
Party (MNP), which officially declared that Malaya was an indispensable part of 
Indonesia in the same year. In 1946, Boestamam formed an extremist organization under 
the MNP named API (Angkatan Pemuda Insaf, the Awakened Youth Corps), which 
leaned towards the realization of independence through revolution rather than gradual 
evolution. Closely linked itself to other left-wing youth organizations both inside and 
outside of the Archipelago, the API launched a series of extremist movement in order to 
                                                 
19 Vasil, R. K., and Australian Institute of International Affairs, 1971, Politics in a Plural 
Society: A Study of Non-Communal Political Parties in West Malaysia. Kuala Lumpur; 
New York: Published for the Australian Institute of International Affairs [by] Oxford 
University Press. P168 
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develop a sense of "patriotism" among Malays, which ultimately led to the first arrest of 
Boestamam.20 After the MNP and the API were disbanded in 1948 and 1950 respectively, 
the Parti Rakyat was founded based on a very similar ideological orientation. 
 
Significantly influenced by the newly established state of Indonesia under left-leaning 
Sukarno, the Parti Rakyat not only adopted a pro-Indonesia strategy in general, but also 
absorbed Sukarno’s ideology of marhaenism into its constitution,21in which the Malay 
leftists defined the party’s main objective as the realization of socio-nationalism and 
socio-democracy through anti-dictatorialism, anti-racialism, anti-imperialism and anti-
liberalism by supporting workers’ struggles against capitalists. 22  According to Suara 
Rakyat, the official newspaper of the Parti Rakyat, such kind of socio-nationalism was 
not based on shared blood or descent, but rather, it was shared destiny, shared interests, 
shared history, and shared understanding that had brought different people together and 
made them a nation. 23 Politically, it advocated establishing a socialist country and a just 
and prosperous society in Malaya through anti-colonial struggles. As regards to the 
economic policies, the Parti Rakyat asserted that a systematic and carefully planned 
nationalization must be conducted extensively in all sectors. The party believed that the 
state should play a more important role in the field of industrial production and wealth re-
                                                 
20 ibid. P169 
21 The word marhaen is a Sundanese term for "peasant", and marhaenism was devised as 
the Indonesian style of socialism that favored the loosely defined proletariats. Sukarno 
also promoted this idea as an alternative to communism. 
22 Ibid. P170 
23 “Faham (sosio-nasionalizem) ini menetapkan bahwa sharat untuk melahirkan satu 
bangsa bukanlah persamaan darah atau keturunan melainkan persaaan nasib, 
persamaan kepentingan dan persamaan sejarah atau degnan lain-lain perkataan 
persamaan kemahuan untuk menjadi satu bangsa.” Partai Rakyat Malaya. 1960. Suara 
Rakyat. 
 13 
distribution. In doing so, “state own” must be prioritized, in which all resources that 
related to people’s daily life should be controlled and arranged, or at least overseen by the 
state. 24   
 
Moreover, it was the vision of Melayu Raya25 that formed an important object of the Parti 
Rakyat's political struggles, although the idea was not explicitly demonstrated in the 
party's constitution or manifesto. 26 The fantasy of Melayu Raya attempted to link the 
formation of Malaya to the glorious ages of Malay nation-states such as Malacca and 
Srivijaya in the past, 27 where "all Malays in one region should come together and see 
themselves as One Race, speaking One Language, and belonging to One 
Nation...28“However, there was a strong resistance of the non-Malay communities against 
the idea of Melayu Raya, as they believed that the idea was a sheer racist plot, because 
the sum of all Malays in the region would far outnumber the Chinese and Indians.29  
 
By contrast, the ideological root of the Chinese-dominated Labor Party could be traced 
back to the political ideals of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP), which aimed to 
achieve the independence of Malaya on the basis of equal rights shared by all ethnic 
                                                 
24 “Segala sumber penghidupan rakyat haruslah dipegang dan diatur atau sekurang-
kurangnya diawasi oleh negara.” Ibid. 
25 Literally means the “Great Malay Homeland” that included Indonesia, Malaya, and 
Borneo territories. It can be interchangeably understood as Indonesia Raya. 
26 Kahn, Joel S., and Francis Kok-Wah Loh, 1992, Fragmented vision: culture and 
politics in contemporary Malaysia. Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press. P265 
27 ibid. P263 
28 Cheah, Boon Kheng. 1979. The Masked Comrades: A Study of the Communist United 
Front in Malaya, 1945-48. Singapore: Times Books International. 
29 Kahn, Joel S., and Francis Kok-Wah Loh. 1992. Fragmented vision: culture and 
politics in contemporary Malaysia. Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press. P265 
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groups. The MCP was the first self-alleged non-communal party in Malaya, yet it ended 
up being very ethnic-based and Chinese-oriented due to a reality that they had to face: the 
belief of “Malay supremacy”—which called for the revival of the glorious pre-colonial 
past in Malay history—was deep-seated within Malay communities; whereas the “equal 
rights” only “directly appealed to the Overseas Chinese and Indians.”30 Very similar to 
the MCP, the Labor Party also became more and more communal in the process of 
articulating the equal rights on behalf of the non-Malay communities. 31 
 
Exactly like the non-Malays who were nervous about the establishment of Melayu Raya, 
the Malays also worried about the possible communist/Chinese takeover, which would 
tremendously undermine their dominant position in the region. It seemed that all political 
parties that represented Malays, irrespective of leftists or others, unanimously rejected the 
idea that the MCP had initially proposed, which aimed to realize equal rights among all 
nationalities through revolution. As Muhammad Ikmal Said argued, "Neither the Malay 
left-wing organizations nor the MCP had the vital ingredient--Malay-Chinese unity or 
multiracial unity as a whole--to forge a combined spirit of struggle for independence and 
national liberation."32  
  
                                                 
30 Democrat, 1 December 1946, quoted in Hanrahan (1971: 96). 
31 Kahn, Joel S., and Francis Kok-Wah Loh, 1992, Fragmented vision: culture and 
politics in contemporary Malaysia. Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press. P267 
32 Cheah, Boon Kheng. (1983:299). Quoted by Muhammad Ikmal Said. 1992. Ethnic 
Perspectives of the Left in Malaysia. Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press. P265 
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  III. THE LEFTISTS IN THE FORMATION OF MALAYSIA 
 
On 27 May 1961, Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman of the Federation of Malaya 
gave a speech at a hotel in Singapore, officially announced a plan to form a new country 
called Malaysia, which would include five former British colonies, namely the Federation 
of Malaya, Singapore, Brunei, Sarawak and Sabah. This plan was not only expected to 
impede the expansion of communism more effectively by realizing independence in these 
colonies through the establishment of a shared constitution, but also aimed to balance the 
population ratio between individual ethnic groups. It was commonly believed that the 
merger between Malaya and Singapore would be grounded upon more solid foundations 
due to numerous commonalities they shared: politics, economy, culture, history and so on 
so forth—they were “essentially an inseparable entity”. 33 As regards to Brunei, Sarawak 
and Sabah, the unification seemed to be more complicated. However, based on the result 
of an investigation conducted between 1956 and 1960, the UMNO-led Alliance officially 
identified the indigenous peoples of North Borneo Territories as part of bumiputera, 34 
which could make the incorporation of these three British colonies into Malaysia more 
“feasible” 35— the idea of bumiputera further expanded the scope of being “indigenous” 
                                                 
33 Barisan Socialis Malaysia, "Xing Ma Hebing he Tongyi de Jichu shi Shenme? 星马合
并和统一的基础是什么？(What is the Foundation of the Merger and the Unification 
between Singapore and Malaysia)", Huo Yan Bao = Nyala, Kuala Lumpur: She Zhen, 
Vol. 15, October, 1961. 
34 Malay term, which can be literally translated as “the son of the soil”, indicates the 
indigenous people (predominantly Malays) of Malaysia. 
35 Chen, Jianhong. 2000. Malaiya Laogongdang Wenxian Huibian马来亚劳工党文献汇
编 (The Labor Party of Malaya: Selected Documents), Kuala Lumpur: Malaiya 
Laogongdang Dangshi Gongzuo Weiyuanhui, P359. 
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in the Malayan context, which had been stereotypically known as being “Orang Melayu” 
who lived in Malay Peninsular. Instead, it became a more loosely defined concept of 
people that might refer to anyone who originally came from a broad range of 
geographical spaces across the Archipelago.      
 
Given the fact that the Socialist Front emerged during the very period of the formation of 
Malaysia, it is impossible to neglect the roles that the leftists played in the process of 
decolonization and nation building. It is true that there was a wide range of options given 
to Malayan people by various political powers that represented different interest groups, 
but nevertheless, the central issues always concentrated on the debate over the issue 
between two camps: the Bumiputera, who advocated the revival of the Malay sovereignty 
that had existed in the pre-colonial era, and the non-Malay immigrants, who struggled for 
equal rights and permanent citizenship of the new country. In many Malay extremists’ 
view, “immigrants formed an inextricable part of the colonization process” and thus, the 
realization of the decolonization must be conducted with the emphasis on the Malay 
special rights that “the land belongs to the Malays.” 36 In contrast to the Malays, the 
Chinese and Indians were particularly craving decolonization through popular 
sovereignty, which included the participation of the immigrants by granting them equal 
rights as the indigenous. As Muhammad Ikmal Said argued in his Ethnic Perspectives of 
the Left in Malaysia piece, "(Malay special position or equal rights) is an open question 
and is an object of struggle. Such a struggle, of course, would not occur if the immigrant 
communities in question are small, as they could be accommodated, that is, ‘controlled’, 
                                                 
36 Kahn, Joel S., and Francis Kok-Wah Loh, 1992, Fragmented vision: culture and 
politics in contemporary Malaysia. Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press. P261 
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easily. On the other hand, if they form a large proportion of the population, an 
economically stronger majority as in the Malayan case, the implications are very 
different."37 
 
As of 1961, there were 7.19 million people living in Malaya, 3.57 million of which were 
Malays, who accounted for the majority of the total population; whereas the population of 
Chinese and Indian was 2.63 and 0.77 million respectively. By contrast, the ethnic ratio 
was quite different in Singapore: 0.23 million Malays, 127 million Chinese and 0.14 
Indians. In North Borneo, however, there was no single ethnic group dominated the three 
territories, the ethnic ratio was reasonably even. 38 By adding the population of all these 
former British colonies together, there were 3.99 million Malays, 4.25 Chinese, and 0.72 
million others. From these figures, we can tell that the number of Chinese population was 
actually larger than that of Malays. As a matter of fact, however, there were only 0.88 
million out of 2.63 million Chinese people had the citizenship of Malaya. Similarly, 
although the Chinese population accounted for 80 percent of Singapore’s population, 
Chinese ethnics who had rights to vote were only 0.65 million, which was not even half 
of the total. 39 In this sense, each ethnic group was big enough to contest the others, but 
none of them had the absolute strength to take the lead without making certain 
compromises. This fact also determined that almost all political issues in Malaysia must 
                                                 
37 ibid. P276. 
38 Barisan Socialis Malaysia, "Malaixiya De Yiyi He Qiantu马来西亚的意义和前途
(The Meaning and Prospect of Malaysia: Lim Kcan Siew’s Speech in Johor),” Huo Yan 
Bao (Nyala), Kuala Lumpur: She Zhen, Vol. 3, Issue 10, May, 1963. 
39 Ibid. 
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be approached through communal struggles, or at least in most circumstances, communal 
interests should always be taken into primary consideration. 
 
In the formation of the new country, the two constituent parties of the Socialist Front 
basically followed the same pattern of their previous direct and indirect predecessors, 
which was based on the interests of communal group they represented respectively. It 
was not surprising that the two parties opposed the formation of Malaysia in 1961, which 
was initially welcomed by the Front as an essential step in the process of decolonization, 
since neither the Labor Party, nor the Parti Rakyat felt satisfied with the outcome that 
largely built upon the compromise made between the constituent parties within the 
Alliance. Ostensibly, the Labor Party and the Parti Rakyat reached many consensuses and 
thus, put forward a number of joint statements to contest the Alliance Government. Under 
the façade of solidarity, however, each constituent party of the Socialist Front also 
brought up nuanced reasons for opposing this plan, due to the divergence of their 
respective vision and objectives in the process of nation building:  
 
3.1 “Bahasa Jiwa Bangsa” 
From 16 to 21 September 1956, the 3rd Congress of Malay Language and Literature 
(KBPM) 40 was held in Johor Bahru and Singapore. There were 500 representatives of 59 
organizations from across Malaya attended this event. On this congress, the Balai 
Pustaka, 41 a small office under the Ministry of Education, was upgraded into Dewan 
                                                 
40 KBPM is the acronym of the Congress’s Malay name, Kongres Bahasa dan Persuratan 
Melayu. 
41 Malay for The Literature Office 
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Bahasa dan Pustaka (DBP), 42 as an independent government body aimed to develop 
Bahasa Melayu into a national and official language of the new country. The newly 
established DBP adopted a resonant slogan as its founding philosophy—Bahasa Jiwa 
Bangsa, or “language is the soul of the nation.”   
 
Language was never an easy task in the process of nation building for countries that had 
just gained its independence from colonial rules, and this was particularly true in plural 
societies like Malaya. No one should take for granted that Bahasa Melayu got selected as 
the national language automatically, rather, it went through numbers of heated public 
debates and tough political struggles, many issues remained unsettled even after the DBP 
was formed and the slogan “language is the soul of the nation” had been officially 
brought up to the public sphere. From the view of the Socialist Front, there are four 
prevailing tendencies in the making of the national language(s) and the education system, 
which would ultimately push Malaya to four completely different directions: 43 
 
(1) The Socialist Front criticized the Alliance for acting as the “hired thugs” of the British 
colonial power, which aimed to “promote English by sacrificing Bahasa Melayu and 
suppressing other ethnic languages.” 44 The Leftists further pointed out that the Education 
Ordinance and its succeeding version produced by the Alliance was “filled with the odor 
                                                 
42 Malay for The Institute of Language and Literature 
43 Barisan Socialis Malaysia, "Yuwen Jiaoyu De Lunzheng语文教育的论争( The 
Debate on Language Education),” Huo Yan Bao (Nyala), Kuala Lumpur: She Zhen, Vol. 
3, October, 1960. 
44 This was not necessarily true, the Alliance, which was largely comprised of communal 
parties, did have a lot of internal debates about the language policies. Quite possibly, the 
SF just wanted to use these internal conflicts to criticize the Alliance for political 
purposes. 
 20 
of colonialism,” 45 which reflected the Alliance’s goal to ultimately destroy the “already 
quite sophisticated” Chinese education system in Malaya.  
 
(2). Some extreme Malay nationalists advocated recognizing Bahasa Melayu as the only 
legitimate national and official language, as they believed that languages spoken by 
immigrant communities (Chinese and Tamil) had played similar roles as English did in 
enslaving Malays. The Socialist Front also strongly condemned such kind of Malay-
centric view, tried to depict these Malay nationalists as arrogant self-isolated extremists 
who showed no regard to the contributions that Chinese and Indian ethnic groups made to 
the Malayan society, “although they had made the right decision by firmly taking the 
anti-colonist stance.”46 
 
(3) To many people’s surprise, the SF did not really stood side by side with the Chinese 
community in their efforts to make Chinese “the second national language”, 47 as they 
argued in its statement on September 18, 1960:”We acknowledge the contribution that 
Chinese education made in the anti-colonial struggles in the past, but the system is out of 
date and it no longer fit in with the changing environment. We should prevent this kind of 
racist sentiment from penetrating to our minds.”    
 
                                                 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid. 
47 After the Socialist Front disintegrated in 1965, the Labors Party completely shifted its 
policies to support the continuation of Chinese education and to realize “equal rights” for 
Chinese language.  
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(4) Instead, the Socialist Front insisted on its steadfast principles that “English must go 
home.” and “The legal status of English must be terminated as soon as possible.” While 
putting forward a compromise proposal to develop Bahasa Melayu as the national 
language, it also called for accepting Chinese and Tamil’s significance in the social life 
of non-Malay communities, as the Socialist Front suggested that the two languages had 
their progressiveness in “propelling the socialist movements and making great 
contributions to the development of the socialist society.” 48 In doing so, rather than 
changing Chinese and Indian schools into English ones, the Socialist Front proposed that 
these schools should be kept as what they were until 1967, 49 when the legal status of 
English was eliminated as that had been planned in the Constitution.   
 
Based on such language policies, the Socialist Front proposed to build up a unified 
National School System with three different layers, namely the fully-government- 
assisted national comprehensive and regional primary schools, partially assisted 
conforming schools, as well as independent schools, in which Chinese and Tamil 
languages were used as the medium of instruction.  In its Educational Policy， the 
development of Bahasa Melayu and the continuation of ethnic minorities’ languages were 
both highlighted, as the Socialist Front believed that “Unity Through Diversity” 50  was 
                                                 
48 Chen, Jianhong. 2000. Malaiya Laogongdang Wenxian Huibian,马来亚劳工党文献汇
编 (The Labor Party of Malaya: Selected Documents), Kuala Lumpur: Malaiya 
Laogongdang Dangshi Gongzuo Weiyuanhui., P569 
49 This was proposed by Parti Rakyat, but many members of the Labor Party strongly 
opposed the idea, as they believed that the Chinese education should be maintained 
forever. 
50 This term is very similar to the national motto of Indonesia, “Bhinneka Tunggal Ika”, 
which can be literally translated as “Unity in Diversity”, but it is not clear here if the two 
mottos shared the same origin. 
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essential to develop a Malayan consciousness and outlook to assist in the formation of a 
United Citizen Body, that is a Malayan Nation.51  
 
In doing so, the Socialist Front first accused the Alliance Government of its inconsistency 
in dealing with the language issues, 52 not being able to carry out a timely plan that can be 
implemented effectively, 53 and “ignored the past and (sought to) build a future unrelated 
to the existing social systems”. 54  Subsequently, the Socialist Front suggested to 
implement three initiatives: 1) to establish common curriculums under the real social and 
cultural context; 2) promoting Bahasa Melayu as the National Language, and making 
Malay language courses compulsory to all students irrespective of their respective race; 3) 
to gradually establish a kind of linguistically-mixed schools, in which Bahasa Melayu, 
Chinese, Tamil, and English courses would be offered in accordance with people’s 
needs. 55 The Socialist Front’s plan would ultimately lead to the establishment of the 
                                                 
51 Ibid. P599 
52 The Socialist Front pointed out the discrepancies between two reports published by the 
Alliance Government in 1956 and 1957 respectively in its policy statement published in 
Nyala, the official newspaper of the Labors Party: In the 1956 Report, Tun Abdul Razak 
(the Prime Minister) said: “the ultimate objective of education policy in this country must 
be to bring together the children of all races under a National Education System in which 
the National Language is the main medium of Instruction…”, whereas in the 1957 
Education Ordinance, however, the Alliance admitted that “the Education Policy of the 
Federation is to establish a national system of education acceptable to the people as a 
whole which will satisfy their needs and promote their cultural, social, economic and 
political development as nation, with the intention of making the Malay Language the 
National Language of the country whilst preserving and conserving the growth of the 
language and culture of the peoples other than Malaya in the country.” 
53 This is quite understandable that within the Alliance, communal parties representing 
different ethnic groups could hardly reach quick consensus due to their respective 
interests. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Barisan Socialis Malaysia, "Shezhen de Jiaoyu Zhengce Gaiyao社阵的教育政策概要
(The outline of the Socialist Front’s Education Policies)," Huo Yan Bao (Nyala), Kuala 
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comprehensive National School System, within which other schools could be gradually 
assimilated while the existing systems, especially the Chinese and Indian independent 
schools “must be assisted as long as there is a need for them”. 56        
 
Although openly admitted that language education was the most sensitive and 
controversial subjects in the plural society of Malaya, the Socialist Front firmly believed 
that language education would not constitute a serious issue if socialism could be fully 
realized, since “the egalitarianism (with the emphasis on non-racism, non-chauvinism, 
and prioritizing the common interests of the people) that reified in the socialist world 
could ultimately solve all problems.” 57  In other words, the Socialist Front actually 
regarded the language issues as “minor tasks in the socialist movement.” 58 Bearing this 
in mind, the leftists thus interpreted the struggles of the language as part of its struggles 
for the rights and interests of “the oppressed”—“During the colonial era, the main interest 
in Education was to create a distinct and separate class of people with knowledge of 
English to assist the Colonial Government in its economic and political exploitation of 
the non-English educated mass.” 59 Therefore, the Socialist Front generally based all its 
                                                                                                                                                 
Lumpur: She Zhen, Vol. 11, June 1961. The third point was specified in the Article 152 
of the Constituion. 
56 Chen, Jianhong. 2000. Malaiya Laogongdang Wenxian Huibian马来亚劳工党文献汇
编(The Labor Party of Malaya: Selected Documents), Kuala Lumpur: Malaiya 
Laogongdang Dangshi Gongzuo Weiyuanhui, P598 
57 Barisan Socialis Malaysia, "Yuwen Jiaoyu de Lunzheng语文教育的论争(The Debate 
on Language Education), Huo Yan Bao (Nyala), Kuala Lumpur: She Zhen, Vol. 3, 
October, 1960. 
58 Ibid.  
59 Chen, Jianhong. 2000. Malaiya Laogongdang Wenxian Huibian马来亚劳工党文献汇
编 (The Labor Party of Malaya: Selected Documents), Kuala Lumpur: Malaiya 
Laogongdang Dangshi Gongzuo Weiyuanhui, P600. 
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claims upon the association’s principles against the British colonialism or the pro-British 
Alliance Government, which was accused of practicing neo-colonialism.  
 
However, in the articulation of the language policies, the Socialist Front did not make 
much difference comparing to the Alliance, 60 as both associations had their respective 
internal fractions that derived from the fact that each constituent party had to take care of 
its own communal interests. Thus, the selection of national language and the making of 
education policies were also key issues hotly debated between the Labor Party and the 
Parti Rakyat. Due to its radical left-leaning standpoint, the Parti Rakyat, which largely 
represented the voices of Malays, initially opposed the idea of multilingualism, since they 
believed that the Malayan people as an united nation, had to share a common language as 
the national identity, and this language should be no other than Malay. As a result, they 
also suggested that Malay should be used as the sole medium of instruction in schools. In 
the first issue of Suara Rakyat, the official newspaper published by the Parti Rakyat, a 
contributor made a loud appeal to construct a “new culture” in Malaya by promoting 
Bahasa Melayu as the national language. “Extracting cultural elements from each ethnic 
group would not be enough to develop Malayan culture,” he noted, “rather, we should 
absorb ‘progressive cultures’ from abroad…we should learn from Indonesia, unifying our 
spelling system as soon as possible; we should also import more Indonesian books, so 
                                                 
60 As mentioned above, the Alliance illustrated its language policies in the 1957 
Education Ordinance based on the compromises made between UMNO, MCA and MIC, 
which represented Malay, Chinese and Indian respectively, that “the Education Policy of 
the Federation is to establish a national system of education acceptable to the people as a 
whole which will satisfy their needs and promote their cultural, social, economic and 
political development as nation, with the intention of making the Malay Language the 
National Language of the country whilst preserving and conserving the growth of the 
language and culture of the peoples other than Malaya in the country.” 
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that more people could participate in the struggles with a shared culture, and (our society) 
would develop faster.” 61 By contrast, distinct from the view of the Parti Rakyat, the 
Labor Party called for the continuation of Chinese and Tamil education, even though they 
did not really oppose the idea of making Bahasa Melayu the national language. The 
Labor Party argued that the realization of equal rights should not be only limited to rights 
to vote, but also rights to practice different culture, language and access to equal 
economic opportunities. 62  
 
On 15 September 1960, Chairman Ahmad Boestamam of the Parti Rakyat delivered a 
public speech, in which he advocated closing Chinese and Indian schools. In his opinion, 
as soon as the legal status of English education could be terminated by 1967, the Chinese 
and Indian vernacular schools too should be closed so that a unified Malay-medium 
education system could be firmly established with fewer obstacles. Of course, this speech 
was strongly rejected by the Chinese-dominated Labor Party. Although this dispute was 
later superseded by the two party’s joint struggles against the formation of Malaysia, the 
divergence on education issues became a hint that foreshadowed the disintegration of the 
Socialist Front.    
 
While both opinions were imbued with a sense of unity that emphasized the equality and 
solidarity between different ethnic groups, the education policies of this self-alleged non-
                                                 
61 Partai Rakyat Malaya, 1960, “Cong ‘Guojia Yuwenju’ Xiangqi从‘国家语文局’想
起(Reflection on Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka),” Suara Rakyat (People's Voice), May 
1st, 1960 
62 Kahn, Joel S., and Francis Kok-Wah Loh, 1992, Fragmented vision: culture and 
politics in contemporary Malaysia. Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press. P275 
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communal party coalition nevertheless ended up being very similar to the policies 
proposed by those ruling communal parties. Both coalitions reached a minimum 
consensus in the end by presenting policies acceptable but not favored by all constituent 
parties, regardless of whether or not they are ethnic-based.  
 
Although being regarded as unfair and incomplete, this result became the de facto of 
Malaysian language education, which still remains pretty much the same today—no one 
has ever come up with an idea of finding an effective and comprehensively feasible way 
to deal with the relationships between the four languages (Malay, Chinese, Tamil and 
English) that had been widely spoken in the country. Although Malay has been 
successfully made the only national language, and the UMNO-dominated government 
has been conducting promotions of Bahasa Melayu for decades, the outcome has never 
been satisfactory, and the resistance from non-Malay societies has never died out. As a 
“non-racist” language, and more importantly, an indispensible part of Malaysia’s global 
competitiveness in embracing modernity and technological advancement, English has 
never been removed from the daily life of the people in the Malaysian plural society. The 
three-layer school system proposed by the Socialist Front became an unexpected legacy 
of the early debates—Sekolah Kebangsaan, the Malay-medium national schools, get full 
financial supports from the UMNO-dominated government. Sekolah Jenis Kebangsaan, 
the non-Malay-medium National-type Schools, also known as "vernacular schools" that 
use Chinese and Indian as the medium of instruction, only receive partial financial 
assistance from the government on the understanding that Bahasa Melayu would be 
taught as a compulsory subject. The third layer is the independent schools. Thanks to 
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persistent communal struggles, Chinese and Tamil education has been preserved and 
retained by relying on private donations from their respective communities. But the non-
Malay societies still have a serious concern about their constantly jeopardized education 
system, as independent schools can hardly get any support from the government, the 
diplomas of Chinese and Indian independent schools remain unrecognized by the 
authority, and thus, their graduates have no chance to be admitted by the state-run 
national universities. Ironically, the three-layer system initiated by the Socialist Front 
with the view towards the realization of egalitarianism among the citizens ended up 
becoming one of the most criticized issues of today’s public debates regarding the 
language education in Malaysia.  
 
3.2 Merger with Singapore 
Due to the unprecedented upheaval of global communist movement after the Second 
World War, the British authority and later the pro-British Alliance Government had been 
very hesitant to approve the merger request that sought to bring the Federation of Malaya 
and Singapore together. There were two major reasons that led to their reluctance: first, 
the merger would bring about the “imbalance” of ethnic ratio, that is, the Chinese 
population would outnumber the Malays; 63 secondly, there were allegedly too many left-
wing pro-communist extremists in Singapore, who would “jeopardize the security and 
                                                 
63 Up to 1961, the population of Malaya consisted of 3.57 million Malays, 2.63 million 
Chinese, and others; and Singapore had 0.23 million Malays, 1.27 million Chinese. Lim 
Kcan Siew, "Malaixiya De Yiyi He Qiantu—Malaiya Laogongdang Zongmishu Lin Jian 
Shou Tongzhi Wei Roufozhou Zhengxunban Zhi Jianghua马来亚劳工党总秘书林建寿
同志为柔佛州政训班之讲话 (The Meaning and Prospect of Malaya: Comrade Lim 
Kcan Siew’s Speech at Johor),” Huo Yan Bao (Nyala), Kuala Lumpur: She Zhen, Vol. 3, 
Issue 4, December 1, 1962. 
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interests of Malaya and its people.” 64   Thus, the Alliance believed that excluding 
Singapore from Malaysia, at least temporarily, would prevent those “pro-communist” 
leftists from intervening the politics of Malaysia. As a result, by maintaining its control 
over the power of the country’s internal security, the central government would also be 
able to muzzle the communist sympathizers, Chinese-chauvinists, and the left-wing anti-
colonialists more effectively.65 As Tunku put it:” in fact, the people of the Federation of 
Malaya are very concerned about the prospect of the merger with Singapore—those 
Chinese, who account for the majority of Singapore’s population, have close ties with 
China, and there is a tendency that many of them are firm believers of Chinese-
chauvinism, which can be seen from the fact that they even have a Chinese-medium 
university.” 66 Then, he added, “Even the Prime Minister of Singapore admitted that 
Singaporeans are inclined to engage in communism and the related activities, we have 
confirmed this situation through our (the Federation of Malaya) sources of 
intelligence.”67  
 
                                                 
64 Barisan Socialis Malaysia, "Xing Ma Hebing he Tongyi de Jichu shi Shenme?=星马合
并和统一的基础是什么(What is the Foundation for the Merger and the Unification 
between Singapore and Malaya)," Huo Yan Bao (Nyala), Kuala Lumpur: She Zhen, Vol. 
15, October, 1961. 
65 Barisan Socialis Malaysia, "Xin Ma Hebing De Zhengque Tujing: Zhengshi Jian Pipan 
Donggu Li Guang Yao Yu Ying Zhiminzhe Zhi Hebing Lundian新马合并的正确途径：
正视兼批判东姑李光耀与英殖民者之合并论点 (The Right Path for the Merger of 
Singapore and Malaya: To Correctly Understand the Tunku, Lee Kuan Yew and British 
Colonizers’ Viewpoint on Merger), ", Huo Yan Bao (Nyala), Kuala Lumpur: She Zhen, 
Vol. 16, November, 1961. 
66 Here, Tunku refered to Nanyang University 
67 These two quotations of Tunku Abdul Rahman’s speech are directly translated from 
the Chinese records publish in Huo Yan Bao, the original English (or Malay) materials 
are not available. Ibid. 
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To many people’s surprise, on May 27th, 1961, however, Tunku announced a merger 
plan that would not only bring Malaya and Singapore together, but also incorporate 
Brunei, Sabah and Sarawak into a united federation. This move, although ostensibly 
seemed to be quite distinctive from the Alliance’s previous assertions on the merger 
issue, was soon criticized by the left-wing opposition parties from all five places, as they 
saw the ways in which Malaysia would be demarcated was a sheer racist plot. According 
to this plan, Sabah (North Borneo), Sarawak and Brunei would be accepted as the 12th, 
13th, and 14th state of Malaysia respectively, enjoyed the same rights and positions as 
other states did on the Malay Peninsula; whereas Singapore would only be incorporated 
as a companion--"Singapore is to Malaysia just what Northern Ireland is to Britain. ".68  
 
As mentioned above, there would be more Chinese than Malays in terms of the size of 
population if the merger between Malaya and Singapore were to take place. The number 
of Chinese population would also account for a higher percentage of the total population 
than that of Malays if all these five former British colonies were to join together. To 
maintain the quantitative advantage of the Malay population, there were essentially two 
options available to the UMNO leaders who largely represented the communal interests 
of ethnic Malays and had the final say to Malayan politics at that time: 1) to enlarge the 
scope of the Malay ethnic group through a new set of categorization, that is, 
incorporating all indigenous people in Malaya and the three British colonies in North 
Borneo by labeling them as bumiputera, or 2) to reduce the size of non-Malay 
                                                 
68 Tunku Abdul Rahman’s parliamentary speech on October 16, 1961, ibid.  
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populations by isolating them from one another, especially by alienating the Chinese-
dominated Singapore from the center of the political arena.  
 
Of course, the UMNO leaders also needed to take good care of the interests of their non-
Malay partners, that was why the merger plan with Singapore was carried out anyway. 
The plan appeared in a way as if every ethnic group’s voice had been heard and 
considered carefully, and the decision was made based on the communal parties’ 
agreement. But nevertheless, the Alliance’s merger plan was still opposed by the Socialist 
Front, who insisted on the merger in the first place, as they saw the essence of the plan 
was to “prevent Singaporean people from enjoying their legitimate rights, while keep 
forcing them to fulfill the same amount of obligations.” 69 The followings are the stances 
that the major political parties took on this issue: 
 
In the Alliance Government’s view, the merger was acceptable, but a complete 
incorporation of Singapore into Malaya was not. While the autonomy over labor and 
education issues raised by the People’s Action Party (PAP) were negotiable, they 
believed that the power to control Singapore’s internal security, defense, and diplomacy 
must be handed over to the central government of the federation. The Alliance 
Government also further asserted that the merger would not automatically turn 
Singaporean citizens into the citizens of the new federation, as they still had the concern 
about the Chinese issues in Singapore that might challenge its rule. Similarly, the 
                                                 
69 Ibid. 
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Alliance was also very cautious in assigning the seats in the parliament: the number 
would be depending on the autonomy that Singapore would enjoy. 
 
The PAP of Singapore led by Lee Kuan Yew alleged that they were going to make efforts 
to realize the merger at any cost. Distinct from the Alliance who was reluctant to 
incorporate Singapore as a normal state of Malaysia, the PAP did not really oppose the 
idea of complete merger, although they also acknowledged that the current situation was 
premature to realize this goal. While proposing to keep the autonomy in terms of labor 
and education issues, the PAP agreed to deliver over its power in internal security, 
defense, and diplomacy to the central government of the federation. The PAP did not 
think that the debates over Singaporeans’ citizenship would constitute an issue if the 
merger could be successfully achieved.  
 
On the left-wing side, however, there were more different opinions expressed regarding 
the merger issue even between the closely connected the Socialist Front and the Barisan 
Socialis Singapura. 70 The leftists in Singapore provided an either-or option: (1) to turn 
Singapore into a normal state of the Federation, in other words, to undertake a complete 
merger with Malaya; or (2) to maintain the complete autonomy of Singapore, including 
the state’s internal security, and the central government of the Federation would only in 
charge of defense and foreign affairs.  
  
                                                 
70 Literally translated as the Socialist Front of Singapore 
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From the Malayan Socialist Front’s perspective, however, neither the Alliance’s merger 
plan, nor the requests raised by the two forces from Singapore were completely 
acceptable. In their opinion, Singapore should be incorporated into the Federation just 
like Melaka and Penang, the other two states of the Strait Settlements. Additionally, the 
Socialist Front also believed that as a normal state sharing the equal rights and 
obligations, Singapore’s request for autonomy in labor and education issues were absurd, 
since the autonomy had no basis of logic if the merger were to be conducted 
completely.71 As a response to the Alliance’s plan that attempted to limit the number of 
seats of Singapore in the parliament, the Socialist Front suggested that the seats should be 
assigned based on the population of each state, and Singaporeans should be granted the 
citizenship of the Federation once the incorporation had been successfully achieved. If 
such conditions cannot be fulfilled, the two sides must come up alternative ways to carry 
the unification forward by strictly following the principle that “the merger should not be 
turned into a conspiracy of selling out the country.” 72 
 
Due to remaining political uncertainties in the three British colonies in North Borneo, the 
Socialist Front suggested that realizing the merger between Malaya and Singapore first 
would be more feasible. While the Parti Rakyat showed no particular interests in 
incorporating Singapore into the Federation, 73 the Labor Party was very keen on this 
merger issue, as they deemed the relationship between the two places were “as close as 
                                                 
71 Barisan Socialis Malaysia, "Xing Ma Hebing he Tongyi de Jichu shi Shenme?=星马合
并和统一的基础是什么(What is the Foundation for the Merger between Singapore and 
Malaya)," Huo Yan Bao (Nyala), Kuala Lumpur: She Zhen, Vol. 15, October, 1961. 
72 “合并不等于出卖,” ibid. 
73 The Parti Rakyat was more enthusiastic about the idea of Melayu Raya that sought to 
unify the whole Malay World, which seemed to be quite unattainable in the short run. 
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lips and teeth” 74 and repeatedly asserted that Singapore was a part of Malaya and there 
was no basis for their separation.75 In one of many articles published in Huo Yan Bao, the 
official newspaper of the Labors Party, the Socialist Front explained, “no matter in terms 
of economy, political cultures, history, geography or the genealogy of the residents, 
(Malaya and Singapore) had and are still having close ties with each other…therefore the 
tight and stable cooperation of the two peoples appears to be more indispensible today in 
anti-colonization and the struggles for independence, self-determination, and unity.”76 
Consistent with its other claims, the Socialist Front targeted at the British for being ill 
intentioned in causing the separation of the two places, as well as those pro-British right-
wing parties from both sides, 77 who “sing to each other’s tune” 78 stealthily in impeding 
the process of the unification.  The Socialist Front further suggested that the most solid 
foundation where the merger could be based upon was the solidarity of the left-wing anti-
colonial forces from both sides. However, they also pointed out, while the left-wing 
struggles were quite active in Singapore, the leftists on the Malayan side were not strong 
enough: “the great majority of Malay peasants are still largely under the influence of the 
                                                 
74 “唇齿相依”，a commonly used Chinese idiom referring to two objects that are closely 
related and mutually dependent. Barisan Socialis Malaysia, Barisan Socialis Malaysia, 
"Xing Ma Hebing he Tongyi de Jichu shi Shenme? 星马合并和统一的基础是什么
(What is the Foundation for the Merger between Singapore and Malaya)," Huo Yan Bao 
(Nyala), Kuala Lumpur: She Zhen, Vol. 15, October, 1961. 
75 Kahn, Joel S., and Francis Kok-Wah Loh, 1992, Fragmented vision: culture and 
politics in contemporary Malaysia. Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press.. P195 
76 Ibid. 
77 Indicating the Alliance of Malaya and the PAP in Singapore 
78 Chinese idiom “一唱一和”, Barisan Socialis Malaysia, "Xing Ma Hebing he Tongyi de 
Jichu shi Shenme?星马合并和统一的基础是什么(What is the Foundation for the 
Merger between Singapore and Malaya)," Huo Yan Bao (Nyala), Kuala Lumpur: She 
Zhen, Vol. 15, October, 1961. 
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UMNO, which significantly strengthened the domination of the pro-British rightists. This 
is considered the major obstruction in the realization of unification.” 79 
 
To work on the merger more effectively, the Malayan Socialist Conference was held in 
Kuala Lumpur in February 1962. On this conference, the left-wing parties80 reached a 
consensus that the realization of the unification must be based on equality, that is, all 
Singaporean citizens should be recognized as the citizens of the Federation, and the seats 
of the parliament should be assigned according to the ratio of each state’s population. 
However, as demonstrated in the joint communiqué of the conference, the leftists also 
acknowledged that there were a number of unsolvable difficulties that they were facing to 
actuate the complete merger. Hence, they unanimously agreed that rather than integrating 
peoples from the two sides more closely, the partial merger plan proposed by the pro-
British Alliance and PAP would only lead to a larger fracture between different ethnic 
groups. As the result, the leftists claimed that they would support Singaporeans’ struggles 
for the complete autonomy if the complete merger could not be realized. 81  
 
The relationship between the Socialist Front and People's Action Party (PAP) of 
Singapore, the ruling party of the city-state was also worth discussing. On 16 November 
1961, the PAP Government of Singapore publicized the “Memorandum Setting out 
                                                 
79 Ibid.  
80 These Parties included seven left-wing organizations from across Malaya, Singapore, 
Brunei, Sabah and Sarawak. The North Borneo issues were also discussed on this 
conference. I will elaborate this point in next section. 
81 Barisan Socialis Malaysia, "Joint Communiqué of the Malayan Socialist Conference". 
Huo Yan Bao (Nyala), Kuala Lumpur: She Zhen, Vol. 20, March, 1962 
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Heads of Agreement for a Merger between the Federation of Malaya and Singapore”, 
which was signed by both Lee Kuan Yew and Tunku Abdul Rahman. The Socialist Front 
deemed this scheme as a plot of “pseudo-merger”, which would sell out the real interests 
of people from both sides for the politicians own political gains. For instance, according 
to the memorandum, Singapore could only have fifteen seats in the parliament, which 
number was significantly lower than it was supposed to have if the seats were to be 
assigned based on the size of the population. Therefore, from the Socialist Front’s 
perspective, the merger scheme actually exposed Lee Kuan Yew’s real intention, which 
was to strengthen his rule in Singapore by getting closer with Tunku in the merger 
issue.82  
 
In the year of 1962, however, the Socialist Front found it increasingly difficult to 
accomplish its goal to realize a complete merger with Singapore that they had initially 
proposed. Therefore, the Socialist Front started to seek for possible opportunities to 
interact with the PAP. Despite the sharp divergence of understandings on many subjects, 
particularly the communist issues, the Socialist Front agreed to cooperate with the 
allegedly right-wing yet still pro-merger PAP. The PAP was then invited by the Labors 
Party to participate the Malayan Socialist Conference that I discussed above. But the PAP 
eventually withdrew from the conference, since other left-wing parties could not accept 
                                                 
82 Barisan Socialis Malaysia, "Women De Taidu He Lichang我们的态度和立场(Our 
Attitude towards the Memorandum Setting out Heads of Agreement for a Merger 
between the Federation of Malaya and Singapore), " Huo Yan Bao (Nyala), Kuala 
Lumpur: She Zhen, Vol. 17, December, 1961 
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the idea of Malaysia that the PAP insisted on. 83 The collaboration between the Socialist 
Front (esp. the Labor Party) and the PAP finally broke off when the “Chinese chauvinist 
and ideologically extreme” Barisan Sosialis Singapura (the Socialist Front of Singapore), 
the opposition of the PAP and a close partner of the Labors Party, was identified as a 
party worked closely to the “underground MCP”. 84 
 
The “pseudo-merger” scheme was carried out anyway. On 16 September 1963, Singapore 
officially became part of Malaysia. During the brief period of unity, exactly like other 
non-Malay communal parties and the Socialist Front, the PAP also aggressively tried to 
contest the UMNO’s controversial policies that unprivileged the non-bumiputera 
communities. In 1964, two inter-racial riots broke out in Singapore, in which 36 people 
were killed and hundreds of others were injured as Chinese and Malays fought against 
each other. 85 Felt increasingly threatened by the large Chinese population as well as the 
uncontrollable tensions between different ethnic groups after the inclusion of Singapore, 
the UMNO decided to expel Singapore from the Federation. As Tunku explained at the 
                                                 
83 As mentioned above, the PAP intended to ultimately realize the complete unification 
between Malaya and Singapore, but it also acknowledged the fact that the current 
situation was premature to reach this goal. As the result, it accepted the merger plan 
proposed by the Alliance government, which was to allow Singapore to join the 
Federation as a companion, and in the meantime, maintaining its autonomy in labor and 
education issues. 
84 Kahn, Joel S., and Francis Kok-Wah Loh, 1992, Fragmented vision: culture and 
politics in contemporary Malaysia. Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press... P208 
85 There were two riots took place in July and September respectively. In the July riot, 23 
People were killed and 450 people were injured, accompanied by significant loss of 
property. In the September riot, 13 people were killed and other 106 people were injured. 
Although there are many different interpretations, Lee Kuan Yew and some other foreign 
observers attribute the causes of the riots to the ultra-nationalist faction in UMNO, see 
Lau, Albert 1998. A Moment of Anguish: Singapore in Malaysia and the Politics of 
Disengagement. Singapore: Times Academic Press. 
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parliament: “We find that there are only two courses open to us: to take repressive 
measures against the Singapore government or their leaders for the behavior of some of 
their leaders, and the course of action we are taking now, to sever with the state 
government of Singapore that has ceased to give a measure of loyalty to the central 
government.” 86  
 
On 9 August 1965, Lee Kuan Yew proclaimed the independence of Singapore, which 
officially marked the end of the debates over the merger issue of the two territories. At a 
press conference around noon, Lee Kuan Yew said with disappointment: “For me, it is a 
moment of anguish. All my life, my whole adult life, I believed in merger and unity of 
the two territories.” 87  
 
Major discourses usually attribute Singapore’s separation from Malaysia to the friction 
between the central government of Malaysia led by the UMNO and the PAP-led state 
government of Singapore, which was triggered by the rigid interethnic relationship. 88 
However, the Socialist Front pointed out that the separation was actually jointly 
conspired by Tunku, Lee Kuan Yew, and the British—“it was the establishment of 
Malaysia that evoked the people’s resistance across Singapore, Sarawak, Sabah and the 
                                                 
86 On 9 August 1965, Tunku Abdul Rahman gave a speech at the parliament in Kuala 
Lumpur on the separation of Singapore from Malaysia, in the first reading of a resolution 
to pass the Constitution of Malaysia (Singapore Amendment) Bill. 
87 Press Conference, Lee announcing the separation of Singapore from the Federation of 
Malaysia, 9 August 1965 
88 See George, T. J. S. 1973. Lee Kuan Yew's Singapore, London: Deutsch. 
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Federation.” 89 Rather than enjoying the prosperity of the united nation, the Socialist 
Front suggested that Singaporean people suffered a lot from the suppression of the 
Alliance Government during brief period of unity, which could be seen from the 
increasingly frequent interracial riots and the arrests of progressive student activists. 90 
According to She Xun, a news bulletin published by the Penang Branch of the Labor 
Party, Lee Kuan Yew had no choice but to shirk his own responsibility and shift the 
blame onto Tunku. In order to mitigate the anger of Singaporeans, Lee chose to adopt a 
racist approach to contest the domination of the UMNO, who largely represented the 
interests of Malay ethnic group. Felt greatly threatened by Lee’s aggressive provocation, 
some senior members of the UMNO suggested that the central government should take 
over Singapore and arrest Lee Kuan Yew. The British authority was thus forced to make 
another arrangement by separating the two territories that had already been united, as 
they realized that the contradictions between the Alliance and the PAP— “its right and 
left arms”—could be further intensified.  
 
Rather than labeling Lee Kuan Yew as the savior or hero of Singaporeans as many people 
did, the Socialist Front regarded him as the British authority’s puppet that had betrayed 
his people. In the Socialist Front’s view, Lee Kuan Yew not only intended to maintain his 
domination in Singapore by borrowing power from the Alliance Government, but also 
longed for the supreme leadership of the whole Malaysia. In doing so, while alleged to be 
representing the fundamental interests of the public, Lee also tacitly consented to the 
                                                 
89 Barisan Socialis Malaysia, "Jiesan Dama, Xiaochu Zainan解散大马，消除灾难 
(Disband Malaysia, Eradicate Disaster)," She Xun, Penang: the Penang Branch of the 
Labor Party, Vol. 10, 7 October 1961 
90 Ibid.  
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suppression and persecution that the British and the Alliance conducted against 
Singaporeans. 91 Therefore, quite distinct from its initial assertions that aimed to actuate 
the complete merger between the two territories, the Socialist Front commented on the 
separation of Singapore at last as follows: “(the reactionaries) had no choice but to make 
this decision that may tentatively ease the intensification of its internal conflicts. This is a 
great victory for people in their struggles to oppose the illegitimate state of Malaysia, and 
a big progress to ultimately crumble and destroy it.” 92  
 
3.3 Borneo Issues and the Konfrontasi 
 
While actively engaged in the merger negotiations with Singapore, the Socialist Front 
also sought to play a more significant role in the debates on the issues of Brunei, Sabah 
and Sarawak, largely because of its close connections with the left-wing counterparts in 
North Borneo, as well as those in Indonesia, who also claimed sovereignty over these 
territories. It was noteworthy that the Socialist Front really made great efforts in 
reconciling the conflicts between different parties at the early stage: In 1961, the Socialist 
Front sent a high-level “fact-finding mission” to Borneo, 93  and concluded in a less 
extreme way that “Borneo fits into the Malaysian Region of Sumatra, Java and 
                                                 
91 The Socialist Front thought that the PAP failed to take care of Singaporeans’ interests 
after the state was incorporated into Malaysia, particularly in following three aspects: (1) 
the number of seats in the parliament was limited to 15; (2) economy was stifled, as the 
central government took away 40% of its revenue; and (3) The British and the Alliance 
utilized the military bases in Singapore to suppress the anti-colonial (or anti-Malaysia) 
struggles in Singapore and North Borneo.  
92 Ibid. 
93 Cheah, Boon-Kheng, 2006, The Leftwing Movement in Malaya, Singapore and Borneo 
in the 1960s: ‘An Era of Hope or Devil’s Decade’? Inter-Asia Cultural Studies 7 (4) (12): 
641. 
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Malaya.”94 The report of the Socialist Front asserted that the people in Borneo Territories 
must be given a chance of self-determination, which would not harm the interests of 
either Indonesia or Malaysia.  
 
However, the reality was far more complicated than what the Socialist Front’s report had 
suggested. Indonesia, Malaya and the Philippines were all eager to incorporate the vast 
territory—either completely or partially—into its own sphere of influence. Indonesia 
made its sovereignty claim over North Borneo because its leaders saw the whole 
Kalimantan Island as an entirety. From this perspective, despite the fact that the British 
and Dutch had ruled North and South Borneo respectively during the colonial era, 
Indonesia believed that the two territories were inseparable both culturally and 
geographically. Being the actual ruler of Southern Kalimantan, Indonesia thus deemed 
itself as the legitimate inheritor of North Borneo as well. The Philippines also had a 
sovereignty claim over Sabah, the easternmost land of North Borneo. As a reward from 
the Sultan of Brunei, Sabah was granted to the Sultanate of Sulu prior to the coming of 
European colonizers. Since 1878, however, the British North Borneo Company had been 
leasing the territory of Sabah until the Federation of Malaysia was established in 1963. 95 
 
On 27 May 1961, Tunku Abdul Rahman, the then prime minister of the Federation of 
Malaya proclaimed in his speech in Singapore that all former British colonies in the 
                                                 
94 Report to the Socialist Front, The Borneo Territories, 16 November 1961 
95 The Philippine government broke its diplomatic relations with Malaysia when Sabah 
was incorporated into the federation. The relations had not been officially resumed until 
1989, when the Philippine government agreed to put the claim on back burner as they 
sought to establish a tighter political and economic relationship with Malaysia. 
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region, included Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak, Sabah and Brunei would be brought into a 
new federation, namely Malaysia. In some people’s view, Tunku’s proclamation was a 
little bit too sudden, but it was fair to say that the idea of Malaysia mentioned in Tunku’s 
speech was not totally unexpected. When talking about the formation of Malaysia, the 
concept of Melayu Raya 96 must be discussed because it is the source of Malaysia’s 
ideological roots. The origin of Melayu Raya could be traced back to the early 1900s, 97 
when Malay-speaking nationalists and progressives from across the region gathered 
together and came up with this idea that aimed to create a great Malay nation-state that 
would cover the broad areas of Southern Thailand, Malaya, Singapore, Indonesia, the 
entire island of Kalimantan and the Philippines98. Influenced by the idea of “Greater East 
Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere” during the Japanese Occupation, Melayu Raya was re-
organized and started to call on the great unity of Malay-speaking people in the whole 
region. However, this campaign was only constrained to the sphere of Rumpun Melayu. 99 
To Chinese, this loosely demarcated area was still called Nanyang or South Sea; whereas 
                                                 
96 Literally translated as “Great Land of Malays” 
97 Some sources also trace the origin of Melayu Raya to the proclamation of “Sumpah 
Pemuda” or the “Youth Pledge” made on 28 October 1928 by Indonesian nationalists at 
in the then-Dutch East Indies, in which the ideal of “motherland, one nation and one 
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Indonesia.” 
98 Barisan Socialis Malaysia, "Malaixiya De Yiyi He Qiantu马来西亚的意义和前途
(The Meaning and Prospect of Malaysia: Lim Kcan Siew’s Speech in Johor),” Huo Yan 
Bao (Nyala), Kuala Lumpur: She Zhen, Vol. 3, Issue 10, May, 1963 
99 Literally translated as “Malay Race”, which can be either narrowly defined as the 
Malay ethnic group, or widely referred to anyone whose place of ancestral origin can be 
traced to the vast region of the Malay World or the Indonesian Archipelago, also known 
as Rumpun Melayu 
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the British and Dutch were still referring to this region as Southeast Asia or Dutch East 
Indies according to their respective colonial rule.            
 
As I discussed briefly, the Alliance Government conducted a couple of investigations 
between 1956 and 1960 in North Borneo, through which the indigenous population was 
officially brought into its highly politicized categorization system of bumiputera. With 
this concept, the scope of Suku Melayu100 was further enlarged: on one hand, not only the 
ethnic Malays were identified as the native population of Malaya/Malaysia, other ethnic 
minorities in North Borneo, even some of whom had never deemed themselves as sharing 
the same genesis with the Malays, were incorporated into this artificially-constructed 
group. This categorization was quite flexible in demarcating the boundaries of the 
indigenous group. For example, new immigrants could be recognized as bumiputera as 
long as they originally came from somewhere in the loosely defined Malay World. On 
the other hand, however, the categorization was nevertheless quite rigid for those Chinese 
and Indian descendants—no matter how long they had been residing in Malaya and the 
surrounding areas, these two ethnic groups were not considered part of bumiputera.  
 
Consequently, the left-wing Socialist Front accused the Alliance of manipulating the idea 
of Malaysia. In their opinion, Tunku’s Malaysia was quite distinct from the original 
concept of Melayu Raya proposed by the previous Malay-speaking nationalists, which 
included more than 130 million people from across the vast region. But rather, this plan 
would only incorporate a few territories with a total population of 10 million people, 
                                                 
100 Same as Rumpun Melayu, ibid 
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which exactly overlapped with that of the former British colonies, and thus the leftists 
deemed this scheme as “imbued with the odor of colonialism”. The Socialist Front further 
pointed out that the misrepresented Melayu Raya would continue the pattern of Malayan 
politics, as the politicians from Malaya would still dominate the new country. 101 The 
British would also maintain its control over the broad territories of the loosely organized 
federation through those pro-British leaders in Kuala Lumpur. 
 
The Socialist Front believed that the essence of the Malaysian issue was not about the 
inter-racial conflicts at all. But rather, it was the conflicts between the suppressors and the 
suppressed that triggered all these problems. The Socialist Front suggested that if the 
equality of civil rights could be achieved and parliamentary representation was based on 
the actual ratio of population, none of the ethnic groups would be superior or inferior to 
others. Therefore, they condemned the Alliance and the PAP leaders who sought to 
simplify the Malaysian problem as a Malay-Chinese problem, and the Socialist Front 
considered that these “reactionists” were actually trying very hard to maintain their 
superiorities in the political competitions against the “progressionists”. By provoking 
“racism” between different ethnic groups, the Alliance was thus able to place the left-
wing organizations onto very disadvantageous positions:  
 
“The Dayak and Iban people were told that the Chinese-dominated Sarawak United 
Peoples' Party (left-wing) was attempting to seize their lands, but these indigenous people 
                                                 
101 Out of 10 million people in Malaysia, 7 million were living in Malaya, ibid. 
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barely knew that they had been enjoying political supremacy; 102  leftists advocate 
realizing equal rights through complete merger, but Singaporeans (largely Chinese) were 
told that these leftists were actually instigating inter-racial conflicts; leftists call for equal 
political rights (for non-Malays), but Malays were told that the leftists sought to destroy 
them; leftists oppose the current scheme of Malaysia because it is not fair, but Malayan 
Chinese were told that leftists were real communists who sought to demolish the 
country’s solidarity, peace and prosperity.” 103  
 
In spite of various obstructions, the Socialist Front had been persistently denying Tunku’s 
Malaysia plan, which alleged to bring greater solidarities into the plural society. To 
oppose the scheme, the Socialist Front sought to establish a more comprehensive 
cooperation with the left-wing parties from across the region. As mentioned earlier in the 
chapter on Singapore, seven parties 104  from Malaya, Singapore, Brunei, Sabah and 
Sarawak attended the Malayan Socialist Conference in Kuala Lumpur in February 1962, 
at which a joint communiqué was announced—the seven parties reached a consensus that 
before the ideal of Malaysia was carried out for further implementation, the rights of self-
determination must be granted to the three British colonies in North Borneo. 105 Instead of 
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“immediate incorporation”, “Self-determination” also became the fundamental stance 
that the Socialist Front held in tackling the North Borneo issues.     
 
Left-wing organizations usually regarded the formation of Malaysia as a plot of “neo-
colonialism” or “indirect colonialism”. While it was true that the administrative power 
had already been handed over to the Alliance leaders, the newly independent country was 
still highly reliant on the British. From this perspective, the pro-British Alliance was only 
a puppet, through which the British authority could remain powerful in controlling its 
previous colonies’ politics, economy, defense and many other aspects that were key to its 
interests.  In contrast to its Southeast Asian neighbors that obtained their independence 
through the “imagining” and “self-awareness” of the colonized, 106  the formation of 
Malaysia was comparatively more crafted by the colonizers. By manipulating the idea of 
Melayu Raya, the previous demarcation of territories, which was largely based on the 
political sphere of influence between the colonial powers (the British and Dutch), was 
well preserved as it used to be. In this sense, the boundary was more of “British-Dutch” 
rather than “Malaysia-Indonesia”—from the Socialist Front’s view, this was also the 
most direct reason why North Borneo was included in the scheme of Malaysia that the 
Alliance proposed.  
 
On 17 January 1962, the Cobbold Commission was established, consisting of five 
members, and deployed to North Borneo to collect people’s opinions about the Malaysia 
                                                 
106 See Anderson, Benedict R. O'G. 1991. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the 
Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso. 
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plan. 107  The commission concluded that the formation of Malaysia should be 
implemented, as the members reported that there was more than two thirds of the 
population agreed to the scheme proposed by the Alliance government. 108  It was 
commonly believed that the report of the Cobbold Commission subsequently became an 
important foundation in drafting the Constitution of Malaysia. The United Nation (UN) 
also sent two other missions later to investigate the Borneo issues, which had drawn the 
same conclusions to support the formation of Malaysia. 109 However, an armed protest 
broke out in North Borneo to oppose the continuous British rule. 110 The Socialist Front 
                                                 
107 The Commission was headed by Lord Cobbold, the former governor of the Bank of 
England and consisted of other four members: Wong Pow Nee, Chief Minister of Penang; 
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preceded by independence and self-government: this hard core might amount to near 20 
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109 See UN General Assembly 15th Session - The Trusteeship System and Non-Self-
Governing Territories (pages:509-510); UN General Assembly 18th Session - the 
Question of Malaysia (pages:41-44) 
110 Barisan Socialis Malaysia, "Dangqian Jushi Zhinan当前局势指南(A Guidance on 
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interpreted this protest as people’s explicit reaction against the British colonialism and 
Malaysian neo-colonialism. Therefore, the Socialist Front started to question the 
credibility of the reports that the Cobbold Commission and the United Nation produced. 
 
According to Socialist Front, the people of the three territories in North Borneo had never 
been given a real chance of self-determination. Although the United Nation had 
conducted investigations on this issue, a referendum was still much needed to ensure that 
the people in Sabah and Sarawak could have an opportunity to express their true 
wishes. 111  Additionally, the Socialist Front suggested that the voices of opposition 
parties, especially those left-wing organizations, were not heard.  In fact, as early as six 
months prior to the investigation, both the Sarawak United Peoples' Party and Parti 
Rakyat Brunei were muzzled and forbidden to express their anti-Malaysia views to the 
public. Right before the arrival of the UN missions, there was also a large-scale arrest 
against the leftists. Under such circumstance, the Socialist Front cast doubt on the 
fairness and reliability of the UN report, which was based on a superficial investigation 
conducted by merely two batches of seven people in two weeks. 112 
 
Strong Indonesian opposition also further complicated the formation of Malaysia. Both 
the Sukarno-led central government and the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) 
explicitly expressed their objections to the Malaysia plan and accused it of “neo-
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colonialism” 113—exactly the same expression that the Socialist Front used to oppose the 
pro-British Alliance government. The UMNO-dominated Alliance thus started to fiercely 
criticize the Socialist Front for its “anti-Malaysia” and “pro-Indonesia” stance by labeling 
the leftists as the “followers of Indonesian communists”, even though the PKI’s 
opposition to the Malaysia scheme was raised some time later than that of the Socialist 
Front. To fight back, the Socialist Front indicated that the Alliance was the betrayer, who 
had sold out the interests of people by allowing foreign military forces being stationed in 
the country, depriving people’s rights of self-determination on Singapore and Borneo 
issues, and making Malaysia a major hub for western powers to invade other Southeast 
Asian countries. 114 
 
Although Indonesia suggested that it was not going to make any sovereignty claim over 
the north Borneo territories, the Indonesia-Malaysia Confrontation, or Konfrontasi, 
nevertheless broke out on 20 January 1963, when Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio 
declared that his country would adopt a policy of confrontation against Malaysia. On 27 
July 1963, President Sukarno proclaimed that the Indonesian army would “crush” 
(mengganyang) Malaysia.115It was not clear what Indonesia’s exact motive was to initiate 
this confrontation with Malaysia. Major discourses sometimes attribute the causes of this 
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issue to the irrationality of Sukarno, who was over thrilled by the victory his military 
forces just gained in Dutch New Guinea. 116   By comparison, the Socialist Front’s 
interpretation seemed to be more convincing:  
 
“Indonesia has repeatedly claimed that it has no intention to occupy the northern 
territories of Kalimantan, they are just showing their support to Bruneian and Sarawakian 
people’s struggles for independence… Imperialists attempted to utilize Malaysia as their 
strongpoint to invade Southeast Asia, Indonesia would be the first to be affected… to 
uphold the sovereignty over its territories, and to defend the fruits of their anti-imperialist 
struggles, it is understandable they have pursued an anti-Malaysia policy.” 117 
 
Instead of attacking the Indonesians for their armed invasion, the Socialist Front accused 
the Alliance for diverting people's attention from the internal conflicts between different 
classes to a country-to-country territorial dispute. 118 They further suggested that the 
essence of the Konfrontasi was to deal with the Bruneian and Sarawakian people’s 
request for self-determination and independence. In order to mitigate the konfrontasi， 
the Socialist Front put forward a proposal that aimed to challenge the Alliance 
government, namely: 1) to evacuate all foreign military forces from Malaya and North 
Borneo territories; 2) to adopt independent foreign policies based on good-neighborly 
relations; and 3) to recognize people’s rights of self-determination on the Singapore and 
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North Borneo issues. 119  According to the Socialist Front, if all these three points could 
be implemented, the tension would be automatically eased. In the context of Konfrontasi, 
however, neither the Alliance government, nor the British who stood behind it was 
willing to accept these suggestions. On the contrary, there were pervasive fears of 
possible communist takeover greatly influenced the policy making of the pro-British 
government. As Tunku suggested, without the protection of the British armies, a small 
country like Malaya could hardly survive communist expansions, and only in this way, 
could the fruits of independence be safeguarded. 120 Consequently, such suggestions were 
actually used by the Alliance government to prove the leftists’ lack of loyalty to the 
country. 
 
The debate on the loyalty issues reached its climax when the Alliance launched a scheme 
to conscript soldiers in August 1964. Again, the leftists strongly opposed the plan by 
condemning the government for getting deeply involved in an unjust war. In their view, 
the purpose of conscription was to directly assist the British expansion targeted at 
suppressing people’s anti-imperialist struggles in North Borneo territories, which 
severely violated people’s basic rights and their desire for independence: 
 
“The purpose of conscription was not to protect our motherland Malaya at all, but rather, 
it was carried out simply because of the increasingly intensified battles in Sabah and 
                                                 
119 Barisan Socialis Malaysia, "Dangqian Jushi Zhinan当前局势指南(A Guidance on 
Current Situation),” Huo Yan Bao (Nyala), Kuala Lumpur: She Zhen, Vol. 4, Issue 4, 
March, 1963 
120 Barisan Socialis Malaysia, “Yilianchuan de Wenti, Yiguan Yilai De Lichang一连串
的问题，一贯以来的立场 (A Series of Problems, A Persistent Stance),” Huo Yan Bao 
(Nyala), Kuala Lumpur: She Zhen, Vol. 4, Issue 4, December, 1963. 
 51 
Sarawak that the British and their accomplice worried about. To see from historical and 
geographical perspectives, Sabah and Sarawak have never been part of our country; as 
regards to the opinions that the local people expressed, the general public has never 
confirmed that they are willing to accept the rule of the Alliance. ” 121 
 
As always, the more objections the Socialist Front articulated, the more likely they would 
be labeled as “traitors” or “trusted followers of Indonesia”. 122 The leftists became aware 
that they were facing terrible crisis of mistrust and subject to large-scale arrests for 
spreading such kind of speeches. First, the Socialist Front was at a disadvantage in its 
political campaigns against the Alliance due to the lack of resources as an opposition 
party coalition. Secondly, influenced by the Alliance’s high-density propaganda, most 
people were afraid of Indonesia, regardless of which ethnic group they belonged to. 
Malays were frightened by the konfrontasi that Indonesia initiated, in which Indonesian 
armies “invaded” the land of bumiputera; whereas the non-Malay communities also 
worried about the recent anti-Chinese incidents masterminded by the Indonesian right-
wing extremist organization Masyumi.123 The Socialist Front started to realize that any 
attempts to justify Indonesia’s motives in Konfrontasi could jeopardize its own position 
within the complex political structure of Malaysia. Consequently, although strongly 
opposed the conscription, the leftists nevertheless suggested that they were not going to 
lead a boycott against it due to such unfavorable factors.   
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More importantly, the Alliance could easily detain any opposition leaders without trial 
under the Internal Security Act (ISA). The British colonial authority first introduced the 
Emergency Regulations Ordinance in 1948 to combat the armed insurgency of the MCP. 
Throughout the whole period of Emergency, this ordinance was used to conduct 
preventive detentions of communist suspects. Although the Malayan Emergency ended in 
1960, the Alliance government passed the ISA, through which preventive detentions was 
legally retained. As I mentioned earlier, the Malayan leftists were always subject to large-
scale arrests and detentions. This was not only due to the fact that the Socialist Front was 
ideologically linked to the communists in a number of ways, but also its status as an 
opposition party coalition that posed constant threats to the rule of the Alliance 
government. The leaders of the Socialist Front had been repeatedly calling for the 
termination of the ISA so that the parliamentary election could be conducted smoothly, 
but their attempts produced very little effect. 124 On the contrary, the Alliance government 
had been increasingly using the ISA to suppress the leftists, the so-called “Outer 
Organizations of the Communists.” 125 
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On 8 December 1962, the left leaning Parti Rakyat Brunei (PRB) initiated an armed 
insurrection, through which the PRB leader A.M. Azahari advocated establishing an 
independent state named the North Borneo Federation by incorporating Sabah and 
Sarawak into Brunei. Rejected by Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddin III, the insurrection 
encountered tenacious resistance of the police forces that were still loyal to the Sultan. A 
few days later, the rebellion was put down by nearby British troops. Sharing close ties 
with the left-wing PRB, the Socialist Front in Malaya deemed this rebellion as a just anti-
colonial struggle and overtly supported the PRB by accusing the British of “invading” 
North Borneo territories. 126 In response to the PRB rebellion, the governments in Malaya 
and Singapore made a statement to censure the communists for threatening public 
security by initiating this insurrection. On 2 February 1963, hundreds of left-wing leaders 
were arrested in Malaya and Singapore, included Ahmad Boestamam, the chairman of the 
Socialist Front and the Parti Rakyat. 127  Without a doubt, the defeat of the Brunei 
Rebellion and the subsequent large-scale arrests of left-wing leaders in Malaya and 
Singapore was a bitter loss that significantly paralyzed the Socialist Front. 
 
From 7 to 11 June 1963, a summit meeting was held in Manila, at which the 
representatives from Malaya, Indonesia, and the Philippines have agreed to solve the 
North Borneo disputes within the context of the UN General Assembly Resolution. 128 
The three countries reached a consensus that the North Borneo issues would be tackled 
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based on the principle of self-determination. In accordance with the consensus, the three 
countries signed the Manila Accord on 31 July 1963. Meanwhile, President Diosdado 
Macapagal of the Philippines proposed to establish a non-political confederation named 
MAPHILINDO, which was inspired by the Malaya Irredenta ideal that the previous 
Filipino nationalist leader Wenceslao Vinzons envisioned.129 By approaching issues of 
common concern in the spirit of consensus, this proposal aimed to ultimately bring 
together all Malay peoples of the three countries. Although this preliminary plan did not 
include concrete details, the leaders who attended the meeting have approved it in 
principle. 
 
It was ironic that the Socialist Front which had initially supported the similar ideal of 
Melayu Raya did not welcome the MAPHILINDO proposal. Specifically, the Chinese-
dominated Labor Party reacted aggressively against the establishment of the 
confederation. In their view, the concept of MAPHILINDO was very racist, which 
targeted at forming a unity to protect the Malay communities in Malaya, Indonesia and 
the Philippines against China and the Chinese communities in these countries. 130  Tan 
Chee Khoon, a prominent leader of the Socialist Front, argued in his speech in parliament 
that the establishment of MAPHILINDO would pave a way for Indonesian absorption, as 
he warned that Indonesia was a regional dominant power with a population of more than 
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a hundred million people.131 This also became a great opportunity for the Socialist Front 
to fight back, as Tan Chee Khoon asserted: 
 
“Both the Alliance Party and the PAP in particular and other as well have called us 
communists, toeing the PKI line. The pretend to see a communist behind every bush, in 
every nook and corner, under every bed and in every bathroom—and all these 
communists are from the Socialist Front…Let me lay low this communist bogey once 
and for all. We (Socialist Front) are not communist party; nor are we infiltrated by 
communists; and we do not toe the PKI line, nor are we aligned to any foreign political 
party.” 132 
 
However, this did not reverse the Socialist Front’s passive situation in political struggles, 
as they found it increasingly difficult to fight back. Subsequently, the left-wing coalition 
was also placed into an even more disadvantageous position in pre-election campaigns. 
While coping with a number of increasingly complicated issues caused by its internal 
frictions, the on-going Konfrontasi also further escalated the disintegration of the 
Socialist Front. As Vasil noted, “the entire Alliance campaign was geared to prove that 
the Socialist Front was anti-national and pro-Indonesian.” In 1964, while still insisting on 
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enunciating its own position on Malaysia, the Socialist Front finally accepted Malaysia as 
a fait accompli. 133 
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IV. INTRINSIC DIFFERENCES 
 
While encountering various challenges from the inter-partisan competitions, the Socialist 
Front also suffered from divergences within itself: the Chinese-dominated Labor Party 
and the Malay-dominated Parti Rakyat, although both took non-communal concepts as 
their founding fundamentals, they tended to become more and more ethnic-based in terms 
of their respective composition of party members as well as the differing perceptions 
regarding the Malayan issues. It was undeniable that both parties had made tremendous 
efforts to diversify their membership by absorbing people from various ethnic groups and 
promoting ethnic minorities to executive positions, but nevertheless these attempts had 
produced very little effect due to the mono-ethnic nature of each party and the fact that 
the racial estrangement was exceptionally severe during the Emergency period. 
 
Without a doubt, it was during the Emergency period that the separation between races 
that had existed throughout the colonial era was further exacerbated. Under colonial rule, 
most of the non-Malay people in Malaya were laborers working in tin mines and rubber 
plantations or small business owners in towns, whereas most of the Malays were peasants 
or fishermen settled in rural areas. The non-Malays were prohibited from owning lands 
and were never hired by the colonial government. As a result, people from one ethnic 
group were prevented from entering the others’ industry, and thus, there was very limited 
contact between different communities, especially within the lower level of the society. 
During the Emergency period, Chinese laborers became the chief targets of suspicion, as 
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the British Administration regarded them as potential communist sympathizers from 
whom the outlawed MCP obtained its battle supplies and other necessities. Therefore, the 
British initiated a large-scale resettlement project in Chinese communities in order to cut 
off their connections with the MCP members in the jungle. The resettlement areas were 
called Chinese New Villages, in which people lived with limited freedom under the 
supervision of the police. In the meantime, in order to conduct a strict control over the 
perceived pro-communist Chinese, the army and police forces recruited a large number of 
Malays from rural areas. Under such circumstance, the tension between different ethnic 
groups became further intensified. 
 
As I mentioned above, the Labor Party was largely comprised of English-educated 
Chinese moderates in the upper level and the Chinese educated supporters, whereas the 
Parti Rakyat, known as the foremost radical left-wing organization, was led by extreme 
left-wing Malays. Despite the fact that the two parties shared similar political ideals of 
making Malaya a socialist country, the first and the foremost disagreement between the 
two parties emerged even before the Socialist Front was officially formed. The Parti 
Rakyat, which claimed to be representing the interests of Malays, demanded the Labor 
Party to recognize the legal status held by the nine Malay Sultans once the country 
declares its independence. In addition, the Labor Party was also asked to accept Ketuanan 
Melayu 134 that was specified in the Constitution of Malaya. 135  But the Labor Party 
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actually held a quite different view. In its memorandum to the Reid Constitutional 
Commission, 136 the Labor Party noted: “all Malayan nationals shall enjoy equal rights 
and share equal responsibilities.” 137  Therefore the Labor Party problematized the 
continuation of the Sultans’ positions, as they believed that the system was outdated and 
inappropriate to be carried on if the independence has been proclaimed. However, so 
eager was the Labor Party to form a united front with the Parti Rakyat, they eventually 
compromised on both issues, despite the strong oppositional voices within the party. 
 
According to the Policy Statement, the Socialist Front aimed to help Malaya realize its 
complete economic independence through a centrally planned economic system and 
sound national controls for commodities.138 In doing so, Malaya should not only “break 
away from the economic and monopolistic pattern set up by the colonial system,”139 but 
also get rid of the speculative controls of the international market and stabilize the 
national economy by a planned utilization of national resources. 140 In order to push 
forward the industrialization of Malaya, the Socialist Front emphasized the significance 
of organizing the “national capitalists” to work under the planned system, while taking 
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whatever possible actions to take over the industries controlled by foreign powers. Based 
on this foundation, state-own enterprises should be established in order to “absorb” the 
national capitalists under the direction of the socialist government.141 Finally, the states 
would take full control of these businesses. The divergence between the two parties in the 
Socialist Front mainly concentrated on debates such as how nationalization should be put 
forward, and what role the state should play in the process. The Parti Rakyat, being the 
representative and rural Malays who had very little involvement in commerce, insisted on 
initiating a radical nationalization, in which the state must play a larger role in the highly 
centralized economy. On the contrary, the Labor Party only accepted a thorough 
nationalization of the foreign enterprises, since the party’s donors were usually Chinese 
“national capitalists” who owned tin mines and rubber plantations. Among many 
industrial sectors, the Labor Party only agreed to take over the transport industry, which 
was initially owned by the colonial government. The Labor Party was particularly 
cautious in mentioning the tin mines and rubber plantations that may harm the interests of 
the Chinese. The Parti Rakyat, by contrast, aggressively advocated all-round centralized 
control over the production and the distribution. 
 
With regards to elections, the divergence between the two parties of the Socialist Front 
illustrated more communal characteristics than their non-communal ones. Compared to 
the Alliance parties that cooperated with each other quite effectively in elections through 
joint campaigns in ethnic-based communal areas, the Socialist Front only functioned as a 
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loosely organized liaison body, and the roles played by the Front was not specified.142 
Given the fact that the two parties had a number of mutually exclusive areas of support, 
the Socialist Front had no other choice but to split its electoral campaigns on an ethnic 
basis: to let the Parti Rakyat work among the Malays and attract their support and the 
Labor Party woo the Chinese.143 Moreover, the Socialist Front encountered a number of 
difficulties in implementing its joint decisions, since it had limited power to impose 
discipline on its constituent parties and their respective members.144 Constituent parties 
were even reluctant to contest the elections under the name of the Front. As indicated in 
the Annual Report of the Socialist Front for 1958-59, the Labor Party insisted on using 
the banner of its own rather than campaigning for the Front in certain areas. 
 
Funding-wise, the Parti Rakyat faced a far worse situation compared to its partner. 
Highly dependent on the support of the Malay peasantry, who could barely make 
substantial contributions to the funds of the party due to their straitened economic 
strength. By contrast, the Labor Party was better financed, since their supporters had 
relatively higher income. As Vasil noted, either at the state or national level, the leaders 
of the Parti Rakyat were basically professional politicians who had no choice but to earn 
their livelihoods through the party. On the contrary, besides being politicians, the 
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English-educated leaders of the Labor Party usually had extra income from their well-
paid professions such as doctors, lawyers, trade unionists, etc.—instead of relying on the 
politics for livelihood, the leader could even contribute considerably to fund the activities 
of the party. 145  Consequently, in spite of various divergences, the Parti Rakyat was 
financially dependent on the Labor Party in order to maintain its presence in the Malayan 
political arena. In fact, as distrust repeatedly emerged due to the unsatisfactory outcomes 
of elections, that dependent relationship also further escalated the disintegration of 
Socialist Front. 
 
The Socialist Front deemed the 1959 general election as its “chief interest”, as both 
parties showed their “overriding desire to secure a significant number of seats in both the 
national and state legislature with the help of the other.” 146 Ahmad Boestamam, the 
chairman of the Parti Rakyat, ambitiously announced that the Front would field 
candidates in all 104 Parliamentary constituencies,147which was far beyond the number 
that the constituent parties could possibly imagine before the Socialist Front was formed. 
But ironically, due to sharp divergence within the Front in terms of their differing 
political orientations, both parties had prepared their own versions of policy statement. 
Without the compromise made by the moderate leaders of the Labor Party, the Socialist 
Front failed to reach the final consensus to accept the Parti Rakyat’s draft.  
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Furthermore, the English-educated moderates also decided to allow the lower level 
Chinese-educated party members to campaign in the 1959 general election, as they 
considered that those pro-Chinese images had better chances to win Chinese votes—this 
shift signified that the Labor Party actually “started moving rapidly towards a strongly 
Chinese chauvinist position” 148 and became more and more communal not only for the 
purpose of electoral campaigns, but also with regards to its general political inclination. 
The 1959 general election turned out to be a one-sided victory (or failure, depending on 
different interpretations) for the Socialist Front, as it gained significant support of the 
Chinese community because of the Labor Party’s pro-Chinese stance, while the Parti 
Rakyat failed to secure almost any Malay votes, as a result of being “unable to attract 
Malay support on the basis of its ideological appeal or the personal appeal of its 
leaders.”149 
 
It is fair to say that the cooperation between the two constituent parties of the Socialist 
Front stemmed from the non-communal ideology that they had initially held. Ironically, 
however, it was also the self-claimed ethnic-blind coalition that ultimately pushed the 
two parties further into the abyss of the communal politics. At both the state and national 
level, the Socialist Front gained most of its votes from non-Malay communities, 
particularly in Penang, Perak and Selangor, where a large proportion of Chinese 
population resided. In Malay-dominated states such as Perlis, Kelantan, Terengganu, 
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Kedah and Pahang, the Socialist Front not only failed to contest the UMNO-headed 
Alliance, but was also defeated by the Pan-Malayan Islamic Party. The latter attracted a 
lot of Malay electorates by its political ideal of transforming Malaya into an Islamic state. 
Compared to the Socialist Front that was usually labeled as either pro-communist or anti-
religion, 150 apparently the right-wing parties had grasped Malay people’s hearts more 
effectively. While promising Ketuanan Melayu and taking good care of Islam, the Pan-
Malayan Islamic Party also advocated conducting political and economic reforms without 
changing much of the status quo151 that most Malays had enjoyed. 
 
In response to the unsatisfactory outcome of the 1959 general election, the Socialist Front 
decided to get rid of the increasing tendency of gearing towards communalism by making 
certain changes to its own membership composition as well as other relevant policies, as 
they noticed that the Chinese-and-Indian-dominated party was rarely supported by the 
Malay communities. The Labor Party thus planned to absorb more Malays into its higher 
leadership positions, form a strong nationalist line, and persist with anti-communalism 
both inside and outside the Front.152 For instance, Ishak Haji Muhammad, a prominent 
left-wing Malay writer was elected to lead the politic struggles of the Labor Party. 153 
However, what happened next was completely distinct from the policies they had been 
planned—both parties geared towards communalism so much more than before. On one 
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hand, the Labor Party, whose leadership was gradually taken over by the Chinese-
educated, became "an essentially Chinese communal and pro-Communist (pro-Peking) 
party. 154 "Imbued with strong “Chinese chauvinism”, 155  the Labor Party started to 
relentlessly demand the recognition of the MCP and liberal citizenship provisions, which 
aimed to completely abolish Sultans and Ketuanan Melayu.156 The Parti Rakyat, on the 
other hand, rejected a large number of applications from the previous members of 
Chinese National Union of Factory and General Workers, as they believed that the 
participation of these Chinese workers would challenge the Malay domination in the 
party.157 
 
Due to the irreconcilable divergence in various issues, the two parties ultimately rejected 
the merger proposal, which aimed to unify the Socialist Front under one constitution. 
After all of its candidates were defeated in the 1964 election, the Parti Rakyat finally 
realized that it could neither secure the support from the non-Malays because of its pro-
Malay fundamentals, nor could they gain solid support from the Malays, as the left-wing 
ideas had been accused of being related to communism and it had close ties with radical 
Chinese groups during the Emergency. It seemed that the Parti Rakyat could never win 
over the Malay electorates as long as its coalition with the Chinese-dominated Labor 
Party still exists. Therefore, the Parti Rakyat unilaterally withdrew from the Socialist 
                                                 
154 Vasil, R. K., and Australian Institute of International Affairs, 1971, Politics in a 
Plural Society: A Study of Non-Communal Political Parties in West Malaysia. Kuala 
Lumpur; New York: Published for the Australian Institute of International Affairs [by] 
Oxford University Press. P158 
155 ibid. P269 
156 ibid. P114 
157 ibid. P124 
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Front in 1965, as they saw no point to continue the cooperation on the basis of 
unachievable non-communal ideals—it also officially marked the disbandment of the 
short-lived left-wing association. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
 
The Socialist Front attempted to provide a non-communal alternative to the ingrained 
ethnic-based politics in Malaysia within the framework of the new country’s 
Constitution. This was quite different from the previous left-wing parties (MCP, API and 
MNP) that sought for the realization of similar political ideals by launching armed 
revolutions. While trying hard to insert itself into the Malayan political structure by 
bringing in non-communal ideas, the Socialist Front was also drastically re-shaped by the 
system, as it became more and more ethnic-oriented in order to secure more communal 
support in elections. The intrinsic divergence within the Socialist Front determined that 
the organization could only function as a liaison body, and further consensus could be 
hardly reached due to the huge differences between the Malay leftists and their non-
Malay counterparts. It is fair to say that the left-wing ideology of democratic socialism 
was seriously manipulated and mistakenly labeled as “communism” (although there were 
connections between the two) during the very period of the Malayan Emergency and the 
few years after it, and therefore, the Socialist Front could not extricate itself from the fate 
of suffering ultimate failure. Objectively, the left-wing thought did make considerable 
ideological contributions to the formation of the new state and the integration between 
ethnic groups. As a matter of fact, however, it still failed to pose substantial challenges to 
the communal parties that played more significant roles in Malaysian politics.  
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Being described as “a plural society par excellence”, Malaysia’s communal struggles are 
irrefutably the most salient part of the countrie’s racial politics. Although the purpose to 
establish the Socialist Front was to break ethnic boundaries by pursing shared ideological 
goals, the party coalition ended up proving very communalistic in a number of ways. In 
response to Vasil’s argument (that Malaysian politics is always more “communal” than 
“ideological”), Tilman also remarked that “‘non-communal political parties’ actually do 
not exist in West Malaysia.” 158 In this context, both arguments had wonderfully reflected 
the very nature of Malaysian politics, namely, non-communal struggles were always 
superseded by fundamental yet indeterminate factors such as race, religion and cultural 
resentment.  
 
However, while recognizing this reality, it was also important to pay attention to the 
subtle relationship between communal politics that sought to take care of the interests of 
individual ethnic group, and the left-wing ideology that encouraged egalitarianism. In 
fact, these two competing forces were not always mutually exclusive. There were as 
many overlaps as contradictions: communal struggles were usually driven by the 
realization of inter-racial equality; likewise, the cries for equality were also regarded as 
an indispensible part of communal struggles. In this sense, the left-wing ideology was 
actually deeply embedded in Malaysian communal politics. 
 
                                                 
158 Tilman, Robert O., and R. K. Vasil, 1972, "Review of Politics in a Plural Society: A 
Study of Non-Communal Political Parties in West Malaysia", The Journal of Asian 
Studies. 32 (1): 212-213. 
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Of course, the idea of “equality” was so dimly discernible that it could be manipulated 
very easily. The relative equality that the ethnic-based Alliance called for was 
communalistic but quite pragmatic. Each communal party was thus able to make 
straightforward requests on behalf its own ethnic group in its negotiations with others. 
Despite the fact that there were many compromises being made within the process of 
such negotiations, the public was convinced that their own parties were speaking for them. 
By contrast, the absolute equality that the Socialist Front advocated was radical and 
somehow too idealistic—it asked people to give up their existing rights (privilege or 
superiority) to exchange unguaranteed equality. At the risk of being simplistic, we can 
see that Malay communities were unwilling to give up ketuanan Melayu (their political 
privilege); whereas non-Malays strongly opposed comprehensive nationalization of their 
businesses (their economic superiority). While the promotion of communal interests was 
usually conducted under the banner of realizing “equality”, the genuine efforts to pursue 
equality through the elimination of inter-racial discrepancies were often seen as a sort of 
betrayal. Here, the realization of equality was indeed very racist. 
 
The left-wing organizations did have very close ties with their Chinese and Indonesian 
counterparts, but this does not necessarily mean that left-wing ideology in Malaya was 
something completely “imported” from outside. Rather, the left-wing ideology had its 
own local roots in the plural society of Malaya—not only stemmed from pervasive 
inequalities among different ethnic groups, but also influenced by deep-rooted hierarchies 
within each of them. Although the Socialist Front successfully identified this problem by 
indicating that the people of Malaya should be re-categorized as oppressors and the 
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oppressed, the public’s attention was diverted to more salient racial conflicts. To a great 
extent, the inequalities between classes were either consciously blurred or unconsciously 
ignored, largely because of the overheated communal struggles and the ambiguous 
identity making within the process of unfinished nation building.    
 
In the formation of Malaysia, the inclusion of North Borneo territories and the exclusion 
of Singapore were both good manifestations of highly politicized boundary making, in 
which nationalism and ethnicity played intricate roles in forming distinctive national and 
ethnic identities. Generally speaking, as we can tell from examples of other countries, 
nationalism drew boundaries to exclude “others” from artificially constructed “selves”; 
whereas ethnicity helped to make concrete distinctions among heterogeneous “selves” 
within the framework of a nation.  In the Malaysian case, however, the process was far 
more complicated. Through the construction of bumiputera, the distant “selves” in 
Borneo were incorporated into the Malay-dominated Malaysia; whereas the close “others” 
in Singapore were rejected due to the city-state’s large Chinese population. By contrast, 
the Socialist Front called for the independence of North Borneo territories and a complete 
merger with Singapore. Although it claimed that these policies were made based on 
people’s wishes of self-determination and their desires for equality, the result could be 
equivalently interpreted as communal-interests-oriented, which was to prevent certain 
ethnic groups from being unwillingly ruled by the others. 
 
The distinct attitudes towards the similar ideals of Melayu Raya and MAPHILINDO were 
also quite problematic. In the regional scale, although the country was still experiencing 
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severe confrontation with Indonesia and the Philippines, the UMNO-dominated 
government nevertheless agreed to join MAPHILINDO which aimed to establish an 
integrated Malay-race confederation across the region. Ironically, while the Socialist 
Front regarded MAPHILINDO as a racist plot, it tacitly approved the ideal of Melayu 
Raya, which had served as a guideline of its early struggles. In this sense, the 
interpretation of political ideals was highly contextual. Rather than these parties’ general 
ideological orientations, it was the specific moments that determined the positions they 
took on various issues. Again, this contradiction reflected the fact that the left-wing 
parties could be equally racist as those communal ones. 
 
It has been more than forty years since the Socialist Front eventually came to an end, but 
a number of issues that the leftists had been fighting for remained unsolved and some of 
them are still visible in today’s plural society of Malaysia. Bumiputera are still enjoying 
favorable treatment from the UMNO-dominated government: better education, better 
employment, and 30 percent share of corporate equity in all Malaysia-based companies. 
The minority of the society still controls the overwhelming majority of the country’s 
wealth and power. A sophisticated patronage system has been firmly established, in 
which wealthy Chinese business tycoons and politically powerful Malay elites benefited 
greatly from helping each other, and the country is constantly operated in accordance 
with their will. The notorious Internal Security Act (ISA), which allowed the government 
to detain suspects without trial or criminal charges, was not repealed until March 2012 as 
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part of the UMNO’s strategy to gain public support for the next general election.159 The 
Chinese and Indian independent school system, although has survived after decades of 
tenacious struggles, remains unrecognized by the government. Students who attended 
these schools have no chance to be admitted by Malaysia’s public universities. The 
tensions between different ethnic groups have been significantly loosened in the public 
sphere, but no one can ignore the fact that cultural resentment is still playing subtle roles 
in many respects of people’s daily life. 
  
                                                 
159 The new Security Offences Bill was presented to the Parliament on 10 April 2012, but 
the activists were still worried about the details of the new security law. Although it has 
explicit provisions that no person will be arrested under the bill “solely for his political 
belief or political activities”, the detention without trial is still allowed. The new Security 
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still worried about the details of the new security law. Although it has explicit provisions 
that no person will be arrested under the bill “solely for his political belief or political 
activities”, the detention without trial is still allowed. Shibani Mahtani，"Malaysian 
Activists Still Worry Over Country’s Security Laws," The Wall Street Journal, 10 April 
2012, http://blogs.wsj.com/searealtime/2012/04/10/malaysian-activists-still-worry-over-
countrys-security-laws/?mod=WSJBlog (accessed 18 April 2012) 
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